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ABSTRACT
The American Law Institute proposes that in contested physical
custody cases, the court should allocate to each parent a proportion of
the child's time that approximates the proportion of time each spent
performing caretaking functions in the past. Examined through the
lens of child development research, the approximation rule is unlikely
to improve on the best-interests-of-the-child standard.
The
approximation rule is difficult to apply, creates a new focus for
disputing parents, renders a poor estimate of parents' contributions to
their child's best interest, and overlooks parents' intangible, yet
significant, contributions to their child's well-being. Measuring pastcaretaking time is difficult, and quantity of care does not correlate
with quality of care. A best-interests standard that retains the benefits
to children of individualized decision making is preferable in the
context of contemporary reforms that accommodate new knowledge
and encourage non-adversarial resolutions of custody disputes.
Keywords: approximation rule, child custody, divorce, custody
disputes, best-interests-of-the-child, joint custody, equal custody,
primary-caretaker presumption, friendly parent presumption,
American Law Institute.
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There is always an easy solution to every human problem-neat,
plausible, and wrong.
- H. L. Mencken
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1972, the best-interest-of-the-child standard (the best-interest
standard) replaced a centuries-old reliance on stereotyped genderbased assumptions in child custody matters. I In recent years, the
emphasis on individualized multi-factored custody determinations
has come under assault. Critics raise two main concerns related to
the broad judicial discretion inherent in the prevailing standard: the
vague standard increases the likelihood of psychologically harmful
litigation (and decreases the rate of pre-trial settlements), and it
serves as a conduit for personal biases to influence outcomes. 2 Of the
various remedies proposed, the one poised to replace the best-interest
standard, by virtue of its endorsement from the prestigious American
Law Institute (ALI), is the approximation rule. 3 The rule divides the
child's time with each parent according to the proportion of time that
each parent participated in caretaking prior to the separation. 4
ALI's Restatements of the Law-formulated by influential jurists,
bar leaders, and law professors-profoundly influence American law,
even prior to legislative endorsement. After a slow start, the
approximation rule is gaining ground. Its impact is felt in courts. In
In re Marriage of Hansen, the Iowa Supreme Court, electing not to
adopt the approximation rule absent legislative approval, nevertheless
praised the rationale behind the rule: "By focusing on historic
patterns of care giving, the approximation rule provides a relatively
objective factor for the court to consider.,,5 In In re The Marriage of
Powers, the same court favorably cites a rationale for the
approximation rule offered by ALI's reporter: '''[P]ast caretaking
1.

2.
3.

4.
5.

See, e.g., Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981); Stephen J. Bahr, Trends
in Child Custody Awards: Has the Removal of Maternal Deference Made a
Difference?, 28 FAM. L.Q. 247, 249 (1994). Professor Guggenheim points out, "Even
though as late as 1976 in more than thirty states the mother was awarded custody of
her young children, so long as she was fit, the tender years doctrine was rapidly
replaced by gender-neutral rules." MARTIN M. GUGGENHEIM, WHAT'S WRONG WITH
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 147 (2005) (endnote omitted).
See Jana B. Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L.
REv. 497, 508 (1987).
AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]'
See Marygold S. Melli, The American Law Institute Principles ofFamily Dissolution,
the Approximation Rule and Shared Parenting, 25 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 347, 353 (2004).
In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007).
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patterns likely are a fairly reliable proxy of the intangible qualities
such as parental abilities and emotional bonds that are so difficult for
courts to ascertain.",6 The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
cited the approximation rule in In re Custody of Kali to support a
preference for the continuity of current relationships.?
In addition to case law citations, the approximation rule has been
adopted by West Virginia;8 must be considered by judges in Catalan,
Spain when making custody determinations;9 and is under serious
consideration in other jurisdictions, including Illinois and
Pennsylvania. 10 Even when the rule falls short of adoption,
proponents' arguments present formidable obstacles to other family
law reform proposals, such as joint custody presumptions. In debates
over child custody reform, the approximation rule has become the
pivotal issue. 11
6.

7.
8.
9.

10.

11.

In re Marriage of Powers, No. 07-0006,2008 WL 2312873, at *2, *3 (Iowa May 16,
2008) (quoting Katharine T. Bartlett, Child Custody in the 21st Century: How the
American Law Institute Proposes to Achieve Predictability and Still Protect the
Individual Child's Best Interests, 35 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 467,473 (1999».
In re Custody ofKali, 792 N.E.2d 635,642 (Mass. 2003).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 48-11-106 (West 2007).
See Andrina Hayden, Shared Custody: A Comparative Study of the Position in Spain
and
England,
INDRET,
Jan.
2011,
at
14-16,
available
at
http://www.indret.com/pdfJ795 _en. pdf.
Illinois is currently considering a proposal that adopts verbatim ALI's description of
caretaking functions and incorporates the approximation rule as one factor in
determining best interests. H.B. 4158, 94th Gen. Assemb., (Ill. 2005). In testimony
before the House Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Family Law of the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives, Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Baer
recommends adoption of the approximation rule as the next standard in custody
legislation. Hearing on H.R. 418, H.R. 463, and H.R. 1639 Before the Subcomm. On
Family Law of the H. Judiciary Comm., 2010 Legis., Reg. Sess. 32-33 (pa. 2010)
(statement of Justice
Baer),
available at http://www.legis.state.pa.us/
cfdocs/legis/tr/transcripts/20 10_0022T.pdf.
See Young v. Hector, 740 So. 2d 1153, 1157-58, 1162-64, 1172-73 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1999) (upholding a trial court's custody determination; withdrawing the ruling
of an appellate panel that relied on the approximation rule; refusing to adopt a
dissenting judge's reliance on the approximation rule); Lynn D. Wardle,
Deconstructing Family: A Critique of the American Law Institute's "Domestic
Partners" Proposal, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1189, 1193 ("[B]ecause many influential
jurists, law professors, and bar leaders helped to create it, it is certain to find a
receptive audience in at least some lawmaking, legal, and academic circles."); Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Introduction to RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 1,2 n.5
(Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) ("It is difficult to overstate the degree of the ALI's
influence. As of March I, 2004, state and federal courts have cited the Restatements
161,486 times."); id. at 3 ("Because of the prestige of the ALI, judges will
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Steeped in assumptions about child and family development, yet
lacking reliable social science support, the approximation rule begs
for closer examination before judges and legislators embrace it. This
article examines the strengths and weaknesses of the best-interest
standard as it is applied in contemporary cases, and compares it with
the alternative proposed by the ALI. Results from the first survey of
lawyers and child custody evaluators regarding the approximation
rule support the conclusion that the rule is unlikely to do a better job
than the status quo in securing children's best interests. 12 The rule
provides incentives to increase rather than reduce parental conflict. 13
It mistakenly assumes that past caretaking is an index of qualitative
aspects of parent-child relations; this assumption reflects a simplistic
and faulty understanding of the science of child development. 14
Furthermore, the exceptions to the rule enumerated by the Principles
of the Law of Family Dissolution (Principles) are precisely the issues
raised in custody disputes; thus, the exceptions swallow the rule and
undermine the Principles' goals of reducing the incidence of custody
undoubtedly rely on the PRINCIPLES as they have relied on the ALI's Restatements.
Legislators are also likely to turn, rightly or wrongly, to the PRINCIPLES for
guidance .... "); Robert 1. Levy, Custody Law and the ALl's Principles: A Little
History, a Little Policy, and Some Very Tentative Judgments, in RECONCEIVING THE
FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF
FAMILY DISSOLUTION 67, 74 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) ("Because the
drafters' proposal comes with the prestigious imprint of the American Law Institute,
whose products in the past have attracted state Supreme Court approvals even without
legislative enactment, and because the proposal has already been enacted by one
legislature, the scheme is likely to receive widespread legislative scrutiny.") (footnote
omitted); Carl E. Schneider, Afterword: Elite Principles: The ALI Proposals and the
Politics of Law Reform, in RECONCEIVING THE F AMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN
LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 489, 491 (Robin
Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006) ("The ALI has wielded influence beyond the fantasies of
its founders. The Model Penal Code and the Restatements are as close to binding
precedent as nongovernmental authority can be, and they are only part of the
Institute's agenda."). For a contrary view describing "the anemic influence of the
Principles with rule makers" see Michael R. Clisham and Robin Fretwell Wilson,

American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years
After Adoption: Guiding Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L. Q. 573,608
12.

13.

14.

(2008).
Richard A. Warshak, The Approximation Rule Survey: The American Law Institute's
Proposed Reform Misses the Target, 5 S. B. TEX. SECT. 22 (2011).
See Rachel M. Colan cecco, Note, A Flexible Solution to a Knotty Problem: The Best
Interests of the Child Standard in Relocation Disputes, 1 DREXEL L. REv. 573, 600
(2009).
See Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development Research to Make
Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions for Young Children, 38 F AM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 297, 297 (2000).
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litigation, narrowing the scope of custody trials, and decreasing
judicial discretion in custody cases. IS
Though courts are fallible, in contested custody cases children's
best interests are more likely to be discerned through a multi-factored
inquiry than by restricting courts to judging the merits of parents'
competing claims about past caregiving time. 16 The best-interest
standard is preferable when it is applied in the context of reforms that
encourage and support non-adversarial approaches to resolving
custody disputes. I? Such reforms, currently in place in many
jurisdictions and endorsed by the Principles, lower the incidence of
protracted litigation, reduce the conflicts to which children are
exposed, and reflect contemporary understanding of factors
associated with optimal adjustment of children whose parents live
apart from each other. 18
II.

GENDER STEREOTYPES AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE
BEST-INTEREST STANDARD

Gender-based presumptions, reflecting stereotypes about the
nature of men, women, and children, have ruled child custody
decisions throughout history.19 Until the early part of the nineteenth
century, common law gave fathers an automatic right to child
custody.20 By virtue of laws regarding property ownership, fathers
15.

16.

17.
18.
19.

20.

PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(a)-(h); id. ch. 1, topic 1 (discussing the goals of
the PRINCIPLES); see also Katharine T. Bartlett, U.S. Custody Law and Trends in the
Context oj the ALI Principles oj the Law oj Family Dissolution, 10 VA. J. Soc. POL'y
& L. 5, 6 (2002) ("The goal of these Principles, which address property distribution,
spousal support, child support, unmarried cohabitation and agreements as well as
custodial arrangements for children, is to achieve greater determinacy in family law
while preserving the autonomy of partners and parents to make their own decisions
about the terms under which relationships, entered into as if permanent, are
dissolved.").
Richard A. Warshak, Punching the Parenting Time Clock: The Approximation Rule,
Social Science, and the Baseball Bat Kids, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 600, 613 (2007)
("Instead of elevating anyone factor above all others, a contemporary application of
the best interests standard allows a multifactored inquiry into children's needs that can
be regularly updated as new knowledge emerges. ").
Id. at 60Q-{) 1.
Id. at 600.
For a detailed discussion of the evolution of child custody law, see LaKeisha J.
Johnson, The Best Interests Standard: How Broad Judicial Discretion and Influences
oj Social and Political Suggestion Have Led to an Abandonment oj the Rule's
Primary Purpose in Child Custody Decisions 1, 7 (Bepress Legal Series, Working
Paper No. 435,2004), available at http://law.bepress.comJexpresso/eps/435.
Id. at 4.
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were best able to provide financially for children. 21 Also, fathers
were considered to be children's natural guardians who could best
bestow love on them. 22 Over time, this sentiment was replaced with
the belief that children of tender years needed nurturing that a mother
could best provide?3 What became known as the tender years
doctrine emerged as early as 1813 in the Pennsylvania decision,
Commonwealth v. Addicks. 24 Overlooking the mother's adultery,
Chief Justice William Tilghman ruled:
We cannot avoid expressing our disapprobation of the
mother's conduct, although as far as regards her treatment of
her children, she is in no fault. They appear to have been
well taken care of in all respects. It is to them, that our
anxiety is principally directed; and it appears to us, that
considering their tender age, they stand in need of that kind
of assistance, which can be afforded by none so well as a
mother. It is on their account, therefore, that exercising the
discretion with which the law has invested us, we think it
best, at present, not to take them from her. 25
In England, the Talfourd Act of 1839 formalized the tender years
doctrine by giving courts the authority to award mothers custody of
children under the age of seven years.26 Over time, the tender years
doctrine was extended to include children of all ages.27
2l.
22.
23.
24.
25.

26.

Jd. at 4-5.
Jd.
Id. at 7-8.
Commonwealth v. Addicks, 5 Binn. 520 (pa. 1813).
Jd. at 521-22. But, three years later, the Court granted custody to the father because
the mother has fallen into a fatal error, on a fundamental point of
morals-the obligation of the marriage contract. It is the more
incumbent on us, therefore, to guard the children against the
consequences of this pernicious mistake, and to fortify their
minds, by inspiring them with fixed principles ....
Commonwealth v. Addicks, 2 Sergo & Rawle 174, 177 (Pa. 1816). For another early
expression of the tender years doctrine, see Helms V. Franciscus, 2 Bland 544, 563
(Ch. Md. 1830) ("The father is the rightful and legal guardian of all his infant
children; and in general, no court can take from him the custody and control of
them. . .. Yet even a court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in
contempt, and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate
mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father. The mother is the softest and
safest nurse of infancy, and with her it will be left in opposition to this general right of
the father. ").
The Talfourd Act was also known as the Custody of Infants Act. The Act was
spearheaded by Lady Caroline Norton and is regarded as the first piece of feminist
legislation passed into law. See 1830 Custody of Children Act, SPARTACUS Eouc.,
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In the 1960s, the movement to liberate our culture from the
straitjacket of rigid gender stereotypes challenged maternal
preference rules. 28 The rise of mothers in the workplace, along with
growing concern about unequal treatment of men and women,
contributed to the decline in a preference for sole maternal custody.29
In addition, results of social science studies throughout the United
States converged to support the position that most children need more
contact with their father after divorce than they were having. 30 The
benefits of father involvement, especially for boys, are most apparent
when the mother values the father--child relationship, the children
witness little overt conflict between parents, and the father is
reasonably well-adjusted, supportive, and authoritative. 31 Based on
these research findings, some scholars advocated replacing the
maternal preference presumption with a joint custody presumption,
whereas other scholars sought to preserve the familiar presumption
but modify its application to provide children more contact with
noncustodial fathers. 32

27.

28.
29.

30.

31.
32.

http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uklWcustody39.htm (last visited Nov. 28, 2011);
Custody
Rights
and
Domestic
Violence,
www.parliament.uk,
http://www.pariiament.uklabout/living-heritage/transformingsocietyIprivateliveslrelationships/overview/custodyrightsl (last visited Nov. 28,2011).
See The Custody of Infants Act, 1873, 36 & 37 Vict. c. 12 § 1 (Eng.); Women &
History:
Marriage
&
Civil Law,
ABOUT. COM,
http://womenshistory.
about.comllibrary/etextlbll 911_womeng.htm (last visited Nov 28, 2011 ) (quoting an
entry from the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica).
See generally BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE (W. W. Norton & Co. 1963).
For a discussion of the literature on feminist opposition to the tender years
presumption, see, e.g., Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence About the Uniform Marriage
and Divorce Act-and Some Reflections About Its Critics and Its Policies, BYU L.
REV. 43,49 (1991). See generally MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO
CHILDREN'S RIGHTS 124 (1994) (discussing the history of American Child Custody
Law).
See, e.g., SANFORD L. BRAVER & DIANE O'CONNELL, DIVORCED DADS: SHATTERING
THE MYTHS (1998) (Arizona); E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, & Roger Cox,
Effects of Divorce on Parents and Children, in NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES:
PARENTING AND CHILD DEVELOPMENT 233 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1982) (Virginia);
in California: JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN BERLIN KELLY, SURVIVING THE
BREAKUP: How CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE (1980) (California);
RICHARD A. WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION (1992) (Texas); Richard A.
Warshak, Father-Custody and Child Development: A Review and Analysis of
Psychological Research, 4 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 185 (1986) (Texas).
Richard A. Warshak, Social Science and Children's Best Interest in Relocation Cases:
Burgess Revisited, 34 F AM. L.Q. 83, 90 (2000).
Shannon Dean Sexton, Note, Custody System Free of Gender Preferences and

Consistent with the Best Interests of the Child: Suggestions for a More Protective and
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By 1972, lawmakers and judges began replacing the tender years
presumption with a gender-neutral best-interest-of-the-child
standard33-although fathers' rights advocates assert that the legacy
of the tender years presumption continues to favor mothers in court,34
and women's advocates claim that the pendulum has swung too far in
the other direction and that judges are biased in favor of fathers. 35
Equitable Custody System, 88 Ky. LJ. 761, 775-76 (2000). See Solangel Maldonado,
Beyond Economic Fatherhood: Encouraging Divorced Fathers to Parent, 153 U. PA.
33.
34.

35.

L. REV. 921, 964--66 (2005).
See Johnson, supra note 19, at 4-5.
See, e.g., William C. Smith, Dads Want Their Day: Fathers Charge Legal Bias
Towards Moms Hamstrings Them as Full-Time Parents, 89 A.B.A. 1. 38,41 (2003);
see also Leighton E. Stamps, Age Differences Among Judges Regarding Maternal
Preference in Child Custody Decisions, 18 CT. REv. 18,20-21 (2002) (reporting the
results of a survey of judges in Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee). The
study found a "fairly consistent tendency toward maternal preference by the judges."
Id. At 20 This bias was more prevalent among older judges. Results indicated that
36% of younger judges and 71% of older judges agreed that "[m]others are the
preferred custodian when children are under the age of 6," while none of the younger
judges and only 1% of the older judges agreed that fathers are the preferred custodian.
Id. See generally David Dotterweich & Michael McKinney, National Attitudes
Regarding Gender Bias in Child Custody Cases, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv.
208, 215 (2000) (reporting that 44% of judges in Maryland, Missouri, Texas, and
Washington agreed that custody awards are made "based on the assumption that
young children belong with their mothers," and only 33% believed that courts give
fair consideration to fathers); William V. Fabricius, Sanford L. Braver, Priscila Diaz
& Clorinda E. Velez, Custody and Parenting Time: Links to Family Relationships and
Well-Being After Divorce, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 201,
212-13 (Michael E. Lamb, ed., 5th ed. 2010) (reporting a study in which about 60%
of family law attorneys thought the Arizona legal system was biased in favor of
mothers, and only 35% thought the system was not gender-biased). Views of bias did
not differ between female and male attorneys or between attorneys whose clients are
predominantly mothers or fathers. Id. at 212. The same study reported that the
general public was even more likely to perceive a "slant" toward mothers (83%) with
only 16% perceiving the legal system as unbiased. Id. at 213 see also BRAVER &
O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 103 (reporting that divorcing parents, both mothers and
fathers, believe that the family law climate favors mothers); Sanford L. Braver,
Jeffrey T. Cookston & Bruce R. Cohen, Experiences of Family Law Attorneys with
Current Issues in Divorce Practice, 51 NAT'L COUNCIL ON FAM. REL. 325, 327-30
(2002) (reporting that experienced divorce attorneys, female and male, believe that the
legal system is biased toward mothers); Sanford L. Braver, Ira M. Ellman, Ashley M.
Votruba & William V. Fabricius, Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce,
17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'y & L. 212,214 (2011) ( "Whatever the objective truth about
judicial decision-making, several studies have shown that the public has the
widespread perception that the custody process is heavily biased in favor of
mothers.").
Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria Used in
Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REp. 235, 236 (1982); Lynn H.
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Referencing legislation that supposedly created an equal playing field
for fathers and mothers, State ex rei. Watts v. Watts reversed a
decision based on the tender years presumption:
[T]here has been a pattern of at least cursory invocation by
the courts in New York and elsewhere, of the presumption
that children of tender years, all other things being equal,
should be given into the custody of their mother. . . . As
Foster and Freed, authors of the comprehensive treatise Law
and the Family, New York, Vol. 2 (1967) stated[,]
"The statutory mandate in practice is ignored and instead
of equality as between the parents, the mother's claim to the
child is paramount." ...
The "tender years presumption" is actually a blanket
judicial finding of fact, a statement by a court that, until
proven otherwise by the weight of substantial evidence,
mothers are always better suited to care for young children
than fathers. This flies in the face of the legislative finding
of fact underlying the specific command of [the statute], that
the best interests of the child are served by the court's
approaching the facts of the particular case before it without
sex preconceptions of any kind. 36
The Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act advanced the provision
that "[t]he court shall determine custody in accordance with the best
interest of the child.,,37 The Act then instructs the court to "consider
all relevant factors," including the wishes of the parents and children;
the children's relationships with parents, siblings, and other people
who may significantly affect the children's best interests; the
children's adjustment to their home, school, and community; and "the
mental and physical health of all individuals involved.,,38 But the
comments to the UMDA contemplate retaining a preference for
maternal custody of young children and regard such a "rule of

36.
37.

Schafran, Gender Bias in Family Courts, 17 FAM. Aovoc. 22-23 (1994). Braver,
Cookston & Cohen, supra note 34, at 330, report that 29% of family law attorneys
believe their "average female clients" would judge the legal system as biased in favor
of fathers and 29% thought these clients would perceive bias in favor of mothers. But
see Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 236, in which only 5% of family attorneys and
about I % of Tucson citizens thought the Arizona legal system was biased in favor of
fathers.
State ex rei. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287-88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973).
UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402 (amended 1973), 9A U.L.A. 282 (\998).

38.

Jd.
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thumb" as a shorthand expression of the best interest of children. 39
By 1981 twenty states expressly abolished the tender years doctrine
by statute or court decision. 40 The doctrine did, however, remain in
effect in some form in at least twenty-two states. 41 In states that
formally abolished the doctrine, it continued to be applied both by
parental decisions and court decisions without formal
acknowledgment. 42 By the mid-1990s, it was apparent that the legal
framework for child custody decisions had undergone a revolution
with many more statutes explicitly prohibiting the centuries-old
reliance on gender preferences. 43 This freed courts to individually
determine the best decision-making and residential arrangements for
children whose parents lived apart from each other.
Operating without the safety net of an explicit presumption leaves
courts with broad discretion. Critics raise several concerns about the
best-interest standard. The chief concerns are that (1) any indefinite
standard increases the likelihood that parents will take their chances
in court rather than settle custody disputes 44 and (2) the standard
provides no objective basis for predicting which custody disposition
will promote a particular child's best interest and thus the vague
standard serves as a conduit for personal biases to influence the
court's decisions. 45
Various alternatives have been proposed to remedy the perceived
problems of the current standard. These include a primary-caretaker

39.

40.
41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. cmt. ("Although none of the familiar presumptions developed by the case law are
mentioned here, the language of the section is consistent with preserving such rules of
thumb. The preference for the mother as custodian of young children when all things
are equal, for example, is simply a shorthand method of expressing the best interest of
children-and this section enjoins judges to decide custody cases according to that
general standard.").
Ex parte Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 691, 691 n.4 (Ala. 1981).
Jd. at 691 & n.3. Tennessee applied a tender years presumption as late as 1996: "In
the case of a child of tender years, the gender of the parent may be considered by the
court as a factor in determining custody after an examination of the fitness of each
party seeking custody." TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101(d) (1996).
See Elizabeth S. Scott, Pluralism, Parental Preference, and Child Custody, 80 CALIF.
L. REv. 615, 617-22 (1992).
See id. at 619-23.
See, e.g., Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgements: Against the Best Interest of the Child, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 1,23-24 (1987); GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 158.
See, e.g., Robert E. Emery, Rule or Rorschach? Approximating Children's Best
Interests, 1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 132, 134 (2007); Robert J. Levy, Rights and
Responsibilitiesfor Extended Family Members?, 27 FAM. L.Q. 191, 197 (1993); Mary
E. O'Connell, When Noble Aspirations Fail: Why We Need the Approximation Rule,
1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 129, 130 (2007).
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presumption, generally favored by mothers' rights advocates;46 a
presumption that the child's time will be divided equally between
homes, generally favored by fathers' rights advocates;47 and an
emphasis on empowering children by giving significant weight to
their expressed wishes, preferred by some scholars who write about
children's rights. 48
In its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, the ALI enters
the debate by proposing an approximation rule to govern court
decisions in cases where parents cannot agree on physical
(residential) custody.49 The rule divides the child's time with each
parent according to the proportion of time that each parent had
participated in caretaking prior to the separation. 50 The Principles
assumes that quantity of past caretaking provides a straightforward
proxy for qualitative psychological factors associated with children's
best interests. 51
Some mental health professionals share this
assumption and believe that the approximation rule will ameliorate
the indefiniteness of the best-interest standard, be easier to implement
46.

47.

48.

49.
50.
51.

For discussions, both pro and con, of the primary caretaker presumption, also known
as the primary parent presumption, see, e.g., Phyllis T. Bookspan, From a Tender
Years Presumption to a Primary Parent Presumption: Has Anything Really
Changed? .. Should It?, 8 BYU J. PUB. L. 75, 83-85 (1993); Martha Fineman,
Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in Child Custody
Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REv. 727, 770-73 (1988); Joan B. Kelly, The
Determination of Child Custody, 4 FUTURE CHILD. 121, 130 (1994); Kathryn L.
Mercer, The Ethics of Judicial Decision-Making Regarding Custody of Minor
Children: Looking at the "Best Interests of the Child" and the "Primary Caretaker"
Standards as Utility Rules, 33 IDAHO L. REv. 389,403-14 (1997); Marcia O'Kelly,
Blessing the Tie That Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian, 63
N.D. L. REv. 481, 533-34 (1987); Carl E. Schneider, Discretion, Rules, and Law:
Child Custody and the UMDA's Best-Interest Standard, 89 MICH. L. REv. 2215,
2283-88 (1991) (analyzing and critiquing the primary caretaker presumption); Paul L.
Smith, The Primary Caretaker Presumption: Have We Been Presuming Too Much?,
75 IND. L. J. 731,732-46; Richard A. Warshak, The Primary Parent Presumption:
Primarily Meaningless, in 10 1+ PRACTICAL SOLUTIONS FOR THE F AMILY LAWYER 123,
123-25 (Gregg M. Herman ed., 2d ed. 2003).
For arguments favoring and opposing joint physical custody, see, e.g., JOINT CUSTODY
& SHARED PARENTING (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY
REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 177-205.
See, e.g., Katherine Hunt Federle, Children's Rights and the Needfor Protection, 34
FAM. L.Q. 421, 434-40 (2000); Randy Frances Kandel, Just Ask the Kid! Towards a
Rule of Children's Choice in Custody Determinations, 49 U. MIAMI L. REv. 299
(1994).
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1).
Id.
See id. § 2.08(1)(d).
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than the current standard, reduce the incidence and scope of custody
litigation, and provide a clear and efficient measure of children's best
interests. 52
III. BENEFITS OF THE BEST-INTEREST-OF-THE-CHILD
STANDARD
Most aspects of the law involve a tension between rules and
discretion, and between objectivity, predictability, and ease of
administration versus individualization and flexibility. Take the
simple act of granting a driver's license to a teen. In Texas, a child
looks forward to becoming eligible for a license on her sixteenth
birthday. 53 The law makes no accommodation for the wide range of
physical and psychological traits related to competent driving.
Regardless of a child's judgment, eye-hand coordination, speed of
reflexes, maturity, and ability to maintain attention versus
distractibility, all teens become eligible for a driver's license the day
they tum sixteen. 54 This law is easy to administer. The date is
objective and predictable. Although some people will not be truly
capable of safe driving until a year later, and some were capable a
year earlier, the law shows no flexibility to take into account
individual circumstances.
Until the last third of the twentieth century, child custody
decisions were guided by presumptions that provided a level of
predictability and ease of administration comparable to that of laws
regarding drivers' licenses. 55 Few allowances were made for
individual family circumstances. 56 A presumption in favor of
maternal custody served as the backdrop of negotiations. 57 It was
clear to all parties that, absent a showing of severe unfitness or such
52.

53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Emery, supra note 45, at 134; Robert E. Emery, Randy K. Otto & William T.
O'Donohue, A Critical Assessment of Child Custody Evaluations: Limited Science
and a Flawed System, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. i, i-ii (2005); Robert F. Kelly &
Shawn L. Ward, Allocating Custodial Responsibilities at Divorce: Social Science
Research and the American Law Institute's Approximation Rule, 40 FAM. CT. REv.
350, 352-53 (2002); Eleanor E. Maccoby, A Cogent Case for a New Child Custody
Standard, 6 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. I, i-ii (2005); GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA,
NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS
FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS
546 (3d ed. 2007).
TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 521.204 (West 2011).
Id.
Emery, supra note 45, at 133; Smith, supra note 34, at 40.
See State ex reI. Watts v. Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285, 287-88 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973).
See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:
The Case ofDivorce, 88 Yale L.J. 950 (1979).
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an exception as adultery, mothers had the upper hand III custody
disputes. 58
The a priori preference for mothers clashed with the movement in
society away from gender-stereotyped roles and with the trend in law
toward equal treatment of men and women. 59 Perhaps more
important, the science of child development progressed to the point
where it documented the widespread harm to children who were
pigeonholed into a one-size-fits-all custody arrangement that reduced
daily contact with fathers to a mere few days per month at most. 60
Although such arrangements were not dictated by a maternal
preference presumption per se, they did proceed from the same belief
that children belonged primarily with their mother.
Society's response was to replace the maternal-custody
presumption with an indeterminate best-interest-of-the-child
standard. 61 Though most jurisdictions provide a list of factors for the
court to consider, these are quite general and allow much room for
judicial discretion. 62 The primary purpose of the best-interest
standard, at least formally, is to underscore the priority of the welfare
of the child who is an innocent bystander to the parents' adversarial
litigation, as opposed to any presumption that treats the child's
welfare as subordinate to parental rights and entitlements. 63 The New
Jersey Supreme Court expresses this purpose:
The "best-interest-of-the-child" standard is more than a
statement of the primary criterion for decision or the factors
to be considered; it is an expression of the court's special
responsibility to safeguard the interests of the child at the
center of a custody dispute because the child cannot be
presumed to be protected by the adversarial process. That
responsibility was perhaps best articulated by Judge
Cardozo:

58.
59.

60.

61.

62.
63.

Watts, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 287-88.
Levy, supra note 29, at 48-50.
See Elizabeth Scott & Andre Derdeyn, Symposium: The Parent-Child Relationship
and the Current Cycle of Family Law Reform: Rethinking Joint Custody, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 455,458-60 (1984).
ANDREW I. SCHEPARD, CHILDREN, COURTS, AND CUSTODY: INTERDISCIPLINARY
MODELS FOR DWORCING FAMILIES 162 (2004).
Id. at I 63-.Q4.
It might be argued, though, that a best-interest determination could mask highly
personal decisions that may not elevate children's needs over other considerations, as
in the example of a judge who rules against a mother because of her adulterous affair.

98

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 41

"[The ChancellorJ acts as parens patriae to do what is
best for the interest of the child. He is to put himself in the
position of a 'wise, affectionate, and careful parent' and
make provision for the child accordingly. . .. He is not
adjudicating a controversy between adversary parties, to
compose their private differences. He is not determining
rights 'as between a parent and a child,' or as between one
parent and another. . .. Equity does not concern itself with
such disputes in their relation to the disputants. Its concern
is for the child.,,64
Beyond the emphasis on children's welfare trumping other
concerns, defenders of the best-interest standard regard its
indeterminacy as ensuring two benefits: flexibility and adaptability.65
The best-interest standard is flexible because it prioritizes
individualized decisions over the expediency of relying on the same
formula for all families. 66 Professor Andrew Schepard regards this
aspect of the standard as "a great moral virtue" and "a tribute to our
society's collective sense that relationships between children and
parents are unique and should be judged individually.,,67 A similar
view is found in Bazemore v. Davis:
A court in a child custody case acts as [p Jarens patriae. It is
not enough to suggest that the task of deciding custody is a
difficult one, or that the use of a presumption would result in
a correct determination more often than not. A norm is illsuited for determining the future of a unique being whose
adjustment is vital to the welfare of future generations.
Surely, it is not asking too much to demand that a court, in
64.

65.
66.

Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556, 577-78 (N.J. 1996) (alterations in original)
(quoting Finlay v. Finlay, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (N.Y. 1925) (quoting Queen v. Gyngall,
[1893] 2 Q.B. 232, at 241 (Eng.)).
See infra pp. 98-102 and accompanying notes.
See Kelly, supra note 46, at 128 ("The best interests standard indicated a willingness
on the part of the legal system to consider custody outcomes on a case-by-case basis,
rather than adjudicating children as a class or homogeneous grouping."); E. MAVIS
HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BEllER OR WORSE: DIVORCED RECONSIDERED

67.

275 (2002) ("Be suspicious of averages and focus on diversity. Averages conceal the
great variability in how individual men and women, boys and girls function in
intimate relationships, and how they cope when these relationships alter or break
down and they have to build a new life. It is the diversity rather than the predictability
or inevitability of pathways in intimate relationships over the course of life that is
striking. . .. [T]here is great diversity in routes taken after marital breakup, in life in a
single-parent household, and in new cohabiting or remarried relationships.").
SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 164.
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making a detennination as to the best interest of a child,
make the determination upon specific evidence relating to
that child alone. . .. [M]agic fonnulas have no place in
decisions designed to salvage human values. 68
The open-ended best-interest standard frees courts to craft
decisions on a case-by-case basis, drawing on a comprehensive
inquiry into each child's needs and the extent to which various
outcomes can be expected to meet these needs. In so doing, it avoids
elevating one factor above all others and, at least fonnally, avoids
relying on stereotypes and parental entitlements. When applying the
best-interest test most courts focus on multiple factors enumerated
either in statutes or in prior legal cases. 69 The reliance on multiple
factors finds support in the social science literature regarding
children's positive and negative outcomes after divorce. 70 In a
comprehensive and erudite review of this literature, Kelly and Emery
conclude:
In the last decade, researchers have identified a number
of protective factors that may moderate the risks associated
with divorce for individual children and that contribute to
the variability in outcomes observed in children of divorce.
These include specific aspects of the psychological
adjustment and parenting of custodial parents, the type of
relationships that children have with their nonresident
parents, and the extent and type of conflict between
parents. 71
The best-interest standard allows courts to consider such
protective factors and to apply knowledge from psychological
68.
69.

70.
71.

Bazemore v. Davis, 394 A.2d 1377, 1382-83 (D.C. 1978) (en banc) (citation omitted)
(citing Lemay v. Lemay, 247 A.2d 189, 191 (N.H. 1968».
Such factors generally include (but are not limited to): the child's relationship with
each parent; the child's wishes; the child's involvement with each parent; the child's
adjustment at home, school, and in the community; the capacity of each parent to meet
the child's developmental needs; special needs of the child; the impact on the child of
the mental and physical health of the parents; evidence of family violence; substance
abuse; each parent's support for the child's relationship with the other parent; and the
degree of cooperation and communication between the parents. See MICH. COMPo
LAWS ANN. § 722.23 (3)(a}-(k) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West
2011); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.134 (West 2005).
Joan B. Kelly & Robert E. Emery, Children's Adjustment Following Divorce: Risk
and Resilience Perspectives, 52 FAM. REL. 352, 356-58 (2003).
Id. at 356.
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research to the specifics of each custody case. The various proposed
alternatives to the best-interest standard, including the approximation
rule, fail to take such factors into account. 72
The second benefit related to the best-interest standard's
indeterminacy is adaptability. It is able to accommodate new
knowledge and understanding about children's needs and to respond
to changing legal and social trends. 73 For instance, in the 1980s,
studies began accumulating that documented a strong association
between positive father-child relationships and child development,
along with an alanning rate of deterioration in father-child
relationships following divorce. 74 Legislatures learned of these
results from advocacy groups and extensive media coverage. 75
Courts learned about these results through expert witness testimony
and briefs. 76 After filtering through political process complexities
and ideological influences, legislatures and courts began interpreting
a child's best interest as including more frequent contact with fathers
to offset the loss of daily contact. 77 Also, research that revealed the

72.
73.
74.

75.
76.

77.

See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08.
Kelly, supra note 46, at 129.
See, e.g., Nicholas Zill, Donna R. Morrison & Mary J. Coiro, Long-Term Effects of
Parental Divorce on Parent-Child Relationships, Adjustment, and Achievement in
Young Adulthood, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 100 (1993) (stating that although grown
children of divorce were more likely than those from intact families to have a number
of problems, most were in the normal range on all measures except one: the only
problem that affected a majority of the divorced group was the quality of relationship
with their father). Two out of three children of divorce suffered chronically poor
relationships with their fathers that failed to improve with time. Id. at 96. For a
review of the literature on the father's role in child development, see HENRY B.
BILLER, FATHERS AND FAMILIES: PATERNAL FACTORS IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (1993);
THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed.
1997); Ross D. PARKE, FATHERS (1981); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION,
supra note 30. It is important to note that social science studies can differ in
methodology or scientific rigor. When results converge from different studies, using
different sample selection procedures and different procedures, and few if any studies
reveal contrary results, scientists have more confidence in the findings.
See Kelly, supra note 46, at 122-23.
See, e.g., Brief of Richard A. Warshak et al. as Amici Curiae on behalf of LaMusga
Children, In re Marriage of LaMusga, 88 P.3d 81 (Cal. 2004) (No. SI07355),
available at http://www.warshak.comlpublications/articles-comp.html; Brief for
Leslie Ellen Shear et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, In re Montenegro v.
Diaz, 27 P.3d 289 (2001) (No. S090699), available at https:llpublic.me.comllescfls
(click "LAAC Relocation" then "Montego Amicus Brief.wpd).
See Kelly, supra note 46, at 127-28.
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harm to children of witnessing their parents' hostile interchanges,78
eventually found its way into court decisions (and negotiated
settlements) that put in place parenting plans that minimized contact
between hostile parents during the child's transition between homes
(e.g., instead of children going directly from one home to the other,
one parent takes the children to school in the morning, the other
parent picks the children up from school in the afternoon). 79 Such
changes are compatible with, and require no modification of, the
best-interest standard. 80 By contrast, a fixed presumption about
custody arrangements would not adapt to or benefit from new
discoveries about how best to help children whose parents live apart
from each other. 81
It must be emphasized that the best-interest standard, and
proposed alternative presumptions such as the approximation rule,
are default positions that generally come into play only when couples
are unable to agree on the division of parenting responsibilities and
take their disputes to court. In the vast majority of cases, parents
exercise the widest discretion in reaching settlements out of court,

78.

For a review, see Janet R. Johnston, Research Update: Children's Adjustment in Sole

79.

Custody Compared to Joint Custody Families and Principles for Custody Decision
Making, 33 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 415,420 (1995).
Joan B. Kelly, Children's Living Arrangements Following Separation and Divorce:
insights from Empirical and Clinical Research, 46 F AM. PROCESS 35,45 (2007).
See generally Kelly, supra note 46, at 128-29 (discussing the flexibility of the best-

80.

81.

interest rule and determining custody on a case-by-case individualized basis to lower
conflict). Systematic changes in the way custody decisions are made may not even
require new legislative public policy statements. See Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at
209, 217 (reviewing studies that report increased rates of joint legal custody and
fathers' parenting time in Washington, Wisconsin, Arizona, and Maine that occurred
in the absence of changes in statutes). The authors attribute such changes to parents'
receptivity to professional guidance and conclude:
Attaining desirable changes in de jure parenting arrangement
practice may not require legislation, court rulings or any other
kind of official imprimatur. Since parents' bargaining appears to
be strongly affected by the informal guidance they receive from
judges, custody evaluators, parent educators, and mediators, and
(especially) attorneys, all that is likely required is a change in this
informal professional culture of belief.
id. at 231.
See generally E. Mavis Hetherington & Margaret M. Stanley·Hagan, The Effects of
Divorce on Fathers and Their Children, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD
DEVELOPMENT 191,202 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 3d ed. 1997) (illustrating issues with
nonresident fathers).
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and courts typically approve their agreements. 82 But the prevailing
legal standard influences even out-of-court agreements by creating a
context for negotiations. 83 This context allows each side to weigh
settlement offers against the perceived likely outcome in court, what
mediators refer to as the BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated
agreement). 84
IV. CRITICISMS OF THE BEST-INTEREST STANDARD
Critics lodge four arguments against the best-interest standard.
1) The best-interest standard "is too subjective to produce
predictable results"; thus, because the BATNA is so uncertain,
parents are less likely to reach out-of-court settlements and more
likely to engage in strategic bargaining and prolonged litigation, all to
the detriment of children. 85 Professor Jon Elster cogently expresses
this concern:

82.

83.
84.
85.

GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 154. Parents' discretion to "privately order" their postdivorce custody arrangements has some limits. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.06
reporter's note a. Under the best-interest standard, courts retain the right to reject an
agreement reached by the parties if the court finds the settlement not in the child's
best interest. GUGGENHEIM, supra note I, at 154; Levy, supra note II, at 67, 78 (both
noting that judges rarely set aside agreements reached in uncontested divorces). It is
noteworthy, though, that the Stanford Child Custody study, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY &
ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF
CUSTODY 103, 303 (1992), found that in 46% of cases in which both parents requested
joint physical custody, and the petitions indicated no evidence of parental conflict, the
court's final decree rejected joint physical custody (with a much higher proportion of
these cases resulting in maternal custody). Some of the discrepancy between the
original petitions and the final outcome may be due to changes in family
circumstances and parental preferences that occurred after the petitions were filed. Id.
at 103. But some may be due to a judge rejecting the uncontested agreement, either
because the judge is dubious about joint physical custody, or because of a special ad
hoc aspect of the arrangement. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.06 reporter's note a.
An example of why this might occur is the case of a woman whom the court believes
was intimidated into an agreement to share custody with a violent man. Id.
Nevertheless, as GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 154, reasons, "Even in the rare
instance that a court rejects a settlement and imposes a child custody arrangement that
neither parent wants, parents who agree among themselves need not enforce the order
once they are out of court."
Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 57, at 978.
See WILLIAM URY, THE POWER OF A POSITIVE No: How TO SAY NO AND STILL GET TO
YES 58 (2007).
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, Preference,
Presumption, Predisposition, and Common Sense: From Traditional Custody
Doctrines to the American Law Institute's Family Dissolution Project, 36 FAM. L.Q.
11, 14 (2002) ("The best-interests standard does little to constrain or steer judges; it
encourages parents to contest custody; and it leaves children vulnerable to the effects
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The best interest principle increases costs to children in two
ways. First, more cases will be brought than if there existed
a strong presumption rule or an automatic decision
procedure because both parties may persuade themselves
that they stand a chance of getting custody. Second, for any
given case that is brought, the legal process will be more
protracted since it is not simply a case of deciding whether
one parent is unfit. 86
Critics assume that an uncertain BATNA not only increases the
prevalence of trials and the length of litigation, it encourages abusive
bargaining in those cases that do settle:
The greatest damage from the lack of clarity in the law
occurs in those divorces, the overwhelming majority, that
are settled by the parties before trial. . .. To the extent that
it is impossible to get or give sound advice on how a court is
likely to resolve a given issue-and a large measure of
discretion means exactly that-the economically stronger
party gains negotiating leverage from the superior ability to
prolong negotiation, to engage in expensive pretrial
discovery, and to use preliminary court appearances for
harassment. 87
Professor Martin Guggenheim argues, as does Elster, that any
clearly defined rule (both seem to prefer a primary caretaker
presumption) would do the least harm to the fewest children because
it would reduce the uncertainty of the likely judicial outcome and
thus spare children the hostilities attendant to adversarial custody
negotiations and litigation. 88

86.
87.
88.

of both."); Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Reconciling the Primary Caretaker Preference. the
Joint Custody Preference. and the Case-by-Case Rule, in JOINT CUSTODY & SHARED
PARENTING 218, 220-21 (Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991); Linda Jellum, Parents Know
Best: Revising Our Approach to Parental Custody Agreements, 65 OHIO. ST. L.J. 615,
630 (2004) ("The discretion judges retain under [the best-interest] standard
encourages litigation. . .. Prior to litigation, the parties cannot know which of two fit
parents a judge is likely to prefer. Thus, they may refuse to negotiate a settlement
under the mistaken belief that they will win.").
Elster, supra note 44, at 24.
Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and
Succession Law, 60 TuL. L. REv. 1165, 1170 (1986).
GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 172-73; see Elster, supra note 44, at 43-44.
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2) Because the best-interest standard does not focus exclusively on
one factor as the basis for decisions or identify which factors will
carry the most weight in the court's decision, the parties may believe
that the way to prevail is to engage in broad character
assassinations. 89 The Principles asserts that, under the best-interest
standard, a parent may attempt "to influence the child, the child's
teachers, and others to see the other parent in a negative light,"
perhaps even hiring experts to assist in highlighting the other parent's
flaws. 90 Litigation that sinks to this level leaves a legacy of hostility
that can, and on many occasions does, undermine subsequent
effective coparenting. 91
3) The best-interest standard provides courts with broad discretion
and no guidance or objective basis to choose between two fit
parents. 92 According to Professor David L. Chambers, one of the
89.
90.

91.

92.

See, e.g., Emery, Otto & O'Donahue, supra note 52, at 5-7, 18-19.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. c. For a description of the motives and means
by which parents negatively influence their children's attitudes toward the other
parent, and the difficulties this creates for their children, see RiCHARD A. WARSHAK,
DIVORCE POISON: How TO PROTECT YOUR FAMILY FROM BAD-MOUTHING AND
BRAINWASHING 79-123 (2010). For preliminary, small-sample studies on the impact
of such negative parental influence on children, see AMY J.L. BAKER, ADULT
CHILDREN OF PARENTAL ALIENATION SYNDROME: BREAKING THE TIES THAT BIND
(2007); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & SANDRA BLAKESLEE, SECOND CHANCES: MEN,
WOMEN, AND CHILDREN A DECADE AFTER DIVORCE 196 (1989); Aaron J. Hands &
Richard A. Warshak, Parental Alienation Among College Students, 39 AM. J. FAM.
THERAPY 45 (2011); Janet R. Johnston, Marjorie G. Walters & Nancy W. Olesen, The
Psychological Functioning of Alienated Children in Custody Disputing Families: An
Exploratory Study, 23 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 39 (2005). In its most severe form,
such malignant parental behavior can result in the complete rupture of the child's
relationship with the other parent and extended family. There is a vast literature
covering theories, research, and experience in the fields of child development and
psychotherapy that demonstrates the handicapping effects of damaged, conflicted, and
absent parent-child relationships on future psychological adjustment. The principle
that family-of-origin relationships influence our future relationships and life
adjustment is not only the foundation of many different schools of psychotherapy and
developmental psychology, it has reached the status of a truism in contemporary
culture. The loss is multiplied when the child is unable to receive and share love with
an entire extended family.
See generally RiCHARD A. GARDNER, CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION: A GUIDE FOR
PARENTS AND MENTAL HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (1986); CARLA B. GARRITY &
MITCHELL A. BARIS, CAUGHT IN THE MIDDLE: PROTECTING THE CHILDREN OF HIGHCONFLICT DIVORCE (1994); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION supra note 30;
WARSHAK, DIVORCE POISON, supra note 90.
Elster, supra note 44, at 2 ("[T]here usually is no rational basis for preferring one
parent over another."); see also Robert A. Burk, Experts, Custody Disputes, & Legal
Fantasies, 14 PSYCHIATRIC Hosp. 140, 141 (1983) ("[T]he attempt to determine which
parent is the better child custodian depends on such fine-grained distinctions as to
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advisers to ALI's project, "The concept of 'children's best interests,'
unlike such concepts as distance or mass, has no objective content.,,93
Often, courts must choose between different parenting styles and
between different ideas and values about raising children. 94 An
indeterminate standard allows decisions based on gender biases,
subjective value judgments, and speculation in place of objective
Professor Robert J. Levy, an adviser to the
considerations.
Principles, suggests the possibility that judges might occasionally
"award custody to those litigants whose attributes and values most
closely resemble their own.,,95 Even when best-interest criteria are
explicitly listed, courts are given no guidance in assigning relative
weights to each factor. 96 Particularly when there is no requirement
that a list of factors be equally and reasonably considered, judges
may "support preferential rulings whenever they so desire by
ignoring those factors which conflict with personal points of view
and making much ado over those that do not. ,,97
4) Because the best-interest standard invites an in-depth inquiry,
critics believe it encourages courts to appoint and depend too heavily
on mental health professionals who conduct evaluations and offer
recommendations. 98 Such critics further contend that child custody
evaluators (and courts) operate with no objective definitions of what
is effective parenting and what are good outcomes for children. 99
Thus, evaluators lack an objective basis to predict which custody
arrangements will promote a particular child's best interest in the

93.
94.

95.
96.

97.
98.
99.

make this, in the context of a custody dispute, a choice between two essentially
indistinguishable alternatives .... ").
David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in
Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REv. 477, 488 (1984).
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. c; Barbara A. Atwood, Comment on Warshak:
The Approximation Rule as a Work in Progress, 1 CHILD. DEV. PERSP. 126, 127
(2007); Robert H. Mnookin, Child-Custody Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the
Face of Indeterminancy, LAW. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 226, 260-61 (1975); O'Connell,
supra note 45, at 130.
Levy, supra note 45, at 197.
See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., The Search for Guidance in Determining the Best Interests
of the Child at Divorce: Reconciling the Primary Caretaker and Joint Custody
Preferences, 20 U. RICH. L. REv. 1, 13-16, 18 (1985).
Johnson, supra note 19, at 11.
Emery et al., supra note 52, at 19-20.
Timothy M. Tippins & Jeffrey P. Wittman, Symposium Issue on Child Custody
Evaluation: Empirical and Ethical Problems with Custody Recommendations: A Call
for Clinical Humility and Judicial Vigilance, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 193, 215 (2005);
Emery, supra note 45, at 133-34.
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present and the future. 100 In general, critics believe that the bestinterest standard, as currently conceived, is impossible to implement
and results in over-reliance on inadequate science. 101 As Professor
Mary Ann Glendon, another adviser to ALI's project, cogently
argues, "The 'best interests' standard is a prime example of the
futility of attempting to achieve perfect, individualized justice by
reposing discretion in a judge .... "102

v.

THE BEST-INTEREST STANDARD AND JUDICIAL
DISCRETION

The four central criticisms of the best-interest standard all relate to
its discretionary quality and the lack of objective and scientifically
valid rules to guide courts in determining best interests. 103 The value
of scientifically-based expert contributions to custody decisions is
debated, and the debate's relevance to the best-interest standard will
be discussed later in this articie. 104 But there is no doubt that the bestinterest standard does confer broad discretion and that such discretion
carries the potential for abuse. This concern is central to Robert H.
Mnookin's lucid and influential critique of the best-interest standard:
"[B]ecause what is in the best interests of a particular child is
indeterminate, there is good reason to be offended by the breadth of
power exercised by a trial court judge in the resolution of custody
disputes." 105
Professor Mnookin contrasts the court's task in custody litigation
with what he terms "traditional adjudication" and he argues that the
discretion of the best-interest standard is anomalous and unduly
excessive. 106 In a masterful, balanced, and incisive analysis, though,
Carl E. Schneider reveals the ubiquity of discretion in American law,
100. See, e.g., Emery, supra note 45, at 133-34; Robert J. Levy, Custody Investigations as
Evidence in Divorce Cases, 21 FAM. L.Q. 149, 149, 151-52 (1987); Sheila Rush
Okpaku, Psychology: Impediment or Aid in Child Custody Cases?, 29 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1117, 1144-45 (1976); O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130.
101. Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 215.
102. Glendon, supra note 87, at 1181 ("Its vagueness provides maximum incentive to those
who are inclined to wrangle over custody, and it asks the judge to do what is almost
impossible: evaluate the child-caring capacities of a mother and a father at a time
when family relations are apt to be most distorted by the stress of separation and the
divorce process itself."); see also Atwood, supra note 94, at 127; Emery et aI., supra
note 50; O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130; Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 215.
103. Emery et aI., supra note 52, at 19.
104. Id at 23; Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 193, 198, 204; see infra notes 255-62
and accompanying text.
105. Mnookin, supra note 94, at 230.
106. Id at 249-55.
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and shows that the elements that Mnookin characterizes as
paradigmatic of custody litigation are common to other areas of law,
such as nuisance law and public law. 107 For instance, Mnookin views
traditional adjudication as usually focused on "the determination of
past acts and facts," whereas custody adjudication focuses on a
prediction of the future and on the character of people. 108 Professor
Schneider counters that "[n]uisance law does require a detennination
of past acts, but often it also requires a determination of the future
effects of various possible remedies.,,109 Schneider quotes Professor
Abram Chayes's work on public law litigation to make a similar
point: "In public law litigation, '[t]he fact inquiry is not historical and
adjudicative but predictive and legislative,' and the decree that
concludes that litigation often 'seeks to adjust future behavior, not to
compensate for past wrong. ",110 Even Mnookin recognizes other
areas in which courts focus broad discretion on "person-oriented"
issues, such as in sentencing, pretrial detention, and-an issue
drawing considerable attention at the time of this writing-preventive
detention. III As with custody detenninations, decisions on these
matters carry significant and long-tenn impacts on the litigants and
the litigants' families. 112
Professor Frederick Schauer provides a broader context in which
to consider the role of discretion in American law by describing a
tradition and legal theory with roots in "American Legal Realism"
and Aristotle's concept of equity:
The tradition starts with an intuitively appealing goalgetting this case just right. But that goal and the tradition
embracing it are in tension with the very idea of a rule, for
implicit in rule-based adjudication is a tolerance for some
proportion of wrong results, results other than the results
that would be reached, all things other than the rule
considered, for the case at hand. In many of the most
important areas of American adjudication, the tolerance for
107. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2239-42.
108. Mnookin, supra note 94, at 249, 251.
109. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2240. It must be noted, though, that nuisance law does
not carry the personal and emotional aspect endemic to custody disputes. See
generally GARDNER, supra note 91.
110. Id. at 2241 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Abram Chayes, The
Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1302, 1298
(1976».
Ill. See Mnookin, supra note 94, at 251-52 (footnotes omitted).
112. See id. at 252-53.

108

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 41

the wrong answer has evaporated, often for good reason,
and the current paradigm for adjudication in the American
legal culture may already have departed from rule-bound
decisionmaking. This new paradigm instead stresses the
importance not of deciding the case according to the rule,
but of tailoring the rule to fit the case. . .. [B]ecause this
new jurisprudence treats what look like rules as
continuously subject to molding in order best to maintain
the purposes behind those rules in the face of a changing
world, we can say that what emerges is a jurisprudence not
of rules but of reasons. 113
Whether or not the court's discretionary authority in custody
adjudication is anomalous or well within the mainstream of American
jurisprudence, Schneider persuasively argues that judicial discretion
is "less unfettered and menacing than it initially appears.,,114 He
catalogs a range of informal deterrents to abuse of discretion,
including self-imposed constraints; concern about the opinions of
colleagues, journalists, and the public at large; the influence of social
norms; the acquisition of habits of thought in law school that restrict
the kinds of decisions a judge will consider acceptable; hearing
evidence that carries the moral force of a disinterested party such as
that provided by a guardian ad litem; and an aversion to having one's
ruling reversed by a higher court. 115 These constraints are in addition
to the more formal checks on discretion such as those placed by court
rules, procedural and evidentiary limitations, legislative mandates,
case law or statutory custody guidelines, restrictions, and policy
(which, e.g., may oblige judges to explain the rationale for custody
decisions 116), the hierarchy of courts that oversee lower courts'
procedures and rulings, and periodic reselection of judges. 117
The ubiquity of discretion and limits on its exercise suggest, but
do not prove, that discretion is inevitable (about which there is
limited dispute) and desirable (about which there is enormous
113. Frederick Schauer, The Jurisprudence of Reasons, 85 MICH. L. REv. 847,847 (1987)
(reviewing RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986».
114. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2218.
115. Jd. at 2254-59.
116. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17 (West 2006) ("The court must make detailed
findings on each of the factors and explain how the factors led to its conclusions and
to the determination of the best interests of the child."). Nevertheless, this need not
constrain the influence of personal biases. According to Professor Levy (personal
communication, Mar. 12, 2009): "Ask (as I do) a group of students to write an opinion
on each side ofa specific custody dispute-they have no trouble."
117. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2258-60.
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dispute). I 18 Most legal scholars recognize that the issue is not a
choice between rules and discretion. 119 Rather, the search is for the
optimal balance between the two, a mix that maximizes advantages
while minimizing disadvantages. 12o This leaves us with the question
of whether the benefits of broad discretion in contemporary custody
adjudication outweigh the drawbacks, and-more to the pointwhether a more determinate rule can adequately address legitimate
concerns about the best-interest standard while avoiding hazards such
as an unacceptable degree of harm to children's welfare. This is the
topic we take up next.
VI. PROPOSALS FOR DETERMINATE CUSTODY
STANDARDS
Critics of the best-interest standard advise a return to firm legal
rules and presumptions as a remedy for the perceived problems of an
indeterminate standard. 121 Some scholars propose a resurrection of
the maternal custody presumption. 122 Others seek to place special
emphasis on one factor chosen from a list of criteria that comprise a
multi-factored best-interest inquiry.123 For scholars who identify
themselves as "children's rights advocates," the chosen factor is the
preferences of a child who has reached a specific age. 124 Others
emphasize the criterion of which parent is most apt to foster the
child's relationship with the other parent, sometimes referred to as
the "friendly parent doctrine.,,125

Id. at 2239.
Id. at 2217-19.
120. Id. at 2218-19.
121. See Patrick Parkinson, The Past Caretaking Standard in Comparative Perspective, in

118.
119.

122.

123.
124.
125.

RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE'S PRINCIPLES
OF THE LAW OF F AMILY DISSOLUTION 446, 449 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
See, e.g., Mary Becker, Maternal Feelings: Myth, Taboo and Child Custody, 1 S.
CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 133, 139 (1992); Martha Minow, Consider the
Consequences, 84 MICH. L. REV. 900, 908 (1986); Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights
and Feminism: The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S LJ. 107, 130
(1978).
See GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 152.
See, e.g., Federle, supra note 48, at 440; Kandel, supra note 48, at 361.
For discussion and critique of the "friendly parent" doctrine, including the conclusion
that it does not solve the problem of indeterminancy, see Margaret K. Dare, The
"Friendly Parent" Concept: A Flawed Factor for Child Custody, 6 Loy. 1. PUB. INT.
L. 41, 42 (2004).
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Primary Caretaker Presumption

A proposal that has attracted considerable support as a
replacement for a multi-factored best-interest inquiry is a
presumption in favor of the parent who is designated the primary
caretaker (sometimes referred to as the primary parent) based on the
pre-separation history of childcare. 126 Some commentators assert that
the primary caretaker presumption closely resembles the
approximation rule in cases where one parent can be shown to have
devoted a majority of caretaking time in the past. 127 But a key
difference is that the primary caretaker presumption requires only
that a litigant demonstrate who provided the most care in order to be
named the parent with primary custody. 128 The approximation rule
induces litigants to document the exact percentage of care in order to
earn a larger share of custody (and perhaps a commensurate share of
child support).129 Nevertheless, many of the arguments for and
against the primary caretaker presumption apply equally to the
approximation rule. 130 Therefore, a more detailed analysis of these
arguments is reserved for the subsequent examination of the
approximation rule.
Briefly, those in favor of a primary caretaker presumption argue
that it 1) is a determinate standard that will reduce litigation rates and
hostile, manipulative negotiations; 2) is gender-neutral; 3) protects
the child's relationship with the parent who is most central to the
child's emotional welfare; and 4) recognizes that the parent who has
the most experience providing childcare is the one who will most
competently manage these responsibilities after divorce. 131 Those
who oppose a primary caretaker presumption argue that it 1) may fuel
hostile litigation by provoking disputes over which parent is
"primary"; 2) favors mothers despite its gender-neutral language; 3)

126. Those favoring a primary caretaker presumption include Chambers, supra note 93, at
478-79 (for preschool children); Fineman, supra note 46, at 773-74; Glendon, supra
note 87, at 1182; Johnson, supra note 19, at 4-5; Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Selective
Recognition 0/ Gender Difference in the Law: Revaluing the Caretaker Role, 31
HARV. J.L. & GENDER 1, 7 (2008); Richard Neely, The Primary Caretaker Parent
Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics a/Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'y REv. 168, 18586 (1984).
127. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 480; see also Parkinson, supra note 121, at 449 ("To the
extent that the past caretaker standard is used to select who should be the primary
caregiver, it is indistinguishable from the primary caretaker presumption.").
128. See Parkinson, supra note 121, at 449.
129. See id. at 454.
130. See id. at 449.
131. See, e.g., Glendon, supra note 87, at 1182; Parkinson, supra note 121, at 454-55.
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relies on a distinction between primary and secondary parent that is
meaningless, particularly for children beyond preschool age; 4)
ignores changes in the family that occur after divorce; and 5) elevates
quantity over quality of care and mistakenly assumes that the amount
of time a parent spends with a child is an index of the parent's
importance to the child, of the quality of their relationship, and of the
parent's competence in child-rearing. 132
B.

Joint Custody Presumption

Other than the primary caretaker presumption, the proposal that
has garnered the most attention is one that bypasses the list of bestinterest criteria. Instead of emphasizing one factor, the proposal calls
for a default presumption of joint physical custody, with the exact
division of the child's time between parents varying among
proposals, ranging from undefined to an equal split. 133
Supporters of a joint physical custody presumption believe that it
1) is a determinate, win-win standard that will reduce litigation rates
and hostile, manipulative negotiations, 2) avoids gender bias, 3)
recognizes the value of, and promotes, the child's relationship with
both parents, 4) is associated with better outcomes for children, 5) is
preferred by most children and the public, and 6) protects the rights
of both parents. 134 Critics of a joint physical custody presumption
believe that it 1) requires a level of cooperation that is not feasible for
parents who cannot agree on custody, 2) favors fathers by giving
those who do not genuinely want this much parenting responsibility
an advantage in negotiations, 3) disrupts the stability and continuity
of care provided by the child's historical primary caretaker, 4)
increases the child's harmful exposure to ongoing parental conflict,
5) is impractical because it requires divorced parents to live in close
proximity to each other, and 6) exposes children to violence and
abuse. 135
132. Those opposing the primary caretaker presumption include Kelly, supra note 46, at
136; Schneider, supra note 46, at 2283 (for an exceptionally thoughtful analysis);
Smith, supra note 46, at 746; Warshak, supra note 46, at 125.
133. For discussions of the arguments for and against joint physical custody see W ARSHAK,
THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 177.
134. Jay Folberg, Custody Overview, in JOINT CUSTODY AND SHARED PARENTING 12-13
(Jay Folberg ed., 2d ed. 1991); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION supra note 30,
at 177-205.
135. Arguing against a joint custody presumption, Sanders, in an otherwise thoughtful and
scholarly analysis, unfortunately cites an advocacy group's citation of a 1996
(incorrectly cited as 1999) report, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL Ass 'N, VIOLENCE AND THE
FAMILY: REpORT OF THE AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION PRESIDENTIAL TASK
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Advocates of the primary caretaker presumption and the joint
physical custody presumption share the goal of replacing the
discretion inherent in the best-interest standard with a bright-line rule
or a rebuttable presumption. 136 One proposal is seen as favoring most
mothers; the other is seen as favoring most fathers. 137 Perhaps

FORCE ON VIOLENCE AND THE FAMILY (1996), to support an alarming wholesale
indictment of family courts: "Abusive parents are more likely to seek sole custody
than nonviolent ones and are successful about 70% of the time." Molly Sanders,

Should Child Custody Awards Be Based on Past Caretaking? The Effect of the
Approximation Standard Ten Years After its Adoption, 30 CHILD. LEGAL RTS. 1. 17, 25
(2010). Before sounding the alarm of a national epidemic of judges placing children
with known abusers, it is important to note that the task force has been criticized for
allowing bias and an advocacy agenda to shape their report. This criticism is
supported by the American Psychological Association (APA)'s subsequent
repudiation of the report. A request addressed to the AP A for a copy of the report, or
for a location where the report could be viewed on the APA Website, received the
following reply: "Thanks for your interest in the AP A 1996 report. It is no longer
available because it is outdated and needs review. AP A has no plans to review and
reprint it." Email from Julia M. Silva, Director, Violence Prevention Office, Pub.
Interest Directorate, Am. Psychological Ass'n, to Richard A. Warshak, Clinical
Professor, Div. of Clinical Psychology, Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. (Dec. 14,2010,
10:35 CT) (on file with author). A similar response from the APA is found at Glenn
Sacks, American Psychological Association Distances Itself from Old APA
FATHERS
AND
FAMILIES
(Mar.
6,
2011),
Publication,
http://www.fathersandfamilies.org/?p=13578. For strong evidence that judges are not
delivering children into the hands of abusive parents and that the 1996 report is far off
the mark in concluding that 70% of violent spouses prevail in custody trials, see T.K.
Logan, Robert Walker, Leah S. Horvath & Carl Leukefeld, Divorce, Custody, and
Spousal Violence: A Random Sample of Circuit Court Docket Records, 18 J. FAM.
VIOLENCE 269, 274-75 (2003). These well-known authorities on domestic violence
report on a random sample of divorce cases. Of thirty-two cases with spousal
violence, only five were decided in a trial and, of those, all were decided in favor of
the mother (four sole custody and one joint custody with mother as the primary
residential parent). Of the remaining twenty-seven cases that settled without a trial,
twenty-four were decided in favor of the mother, one received joint legal custody with
equal residential time, and three were decided in favor of the father. Id. In this
sample, 11 % of the domestic violence orders were petitioned by fathers, so it is likely
that the 9% decided in favor of fathers reflect the few cases in which the father
received a domestic violence order against the mother. Id. But see T.K. Logan,
Robert Walker, Carol E. Jordan & Leah S. Horvath, Child Custody Evaluations and
Domestic Violence: Case Comparisons, 17 VIOLENCE AND VICTIMS 719, 737 (2002)
(expressing concern about violent parents receiving weekly access to, but not custody
of, their children).
136. See Elster supra note 44, at 7, 11-12, 14-15, 21; Chambers supra note 93, at 481,
559, 568-69; Fineman supra note 46, at 727-29, 770; Glendon supra note 87, at
1180, 1182-83, 1195; Laufer-Ukeles supra note 126, at 18-20, 22, 47-50, 65-66;
W ARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 177-205.
137. See Chambers supra note 93, at 481; GUGGENHEIM supra note 1, at 148-51.
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Schneider is correct in suggesting that "the driving force" behind
family law refonn "has not been so much a distrust of discretion as a
dissatisfaction with some specific results that courts have been
reaching and a desire to alter those results by whatever method comes
most easily to hand.,,138
In the real world of crowded dockets, with limited funds for
comprehensive custody evaluations and legal representation, a rule
has strong appeal. It promises to clarify the expected outcome of
trials and thus promote settlements, remove some incentives for
protracted and hostile negotiations and thus relieve children's
exposure to toxic levels of conflict, and expedite the court's
processing of cases that fail to settle. No serious scholar believes that
a custody rule will work best for all children. Rather, the assumption
is that such a rule will work best for most children. 139
VII. THE APPROXIMATION RULE: PRESUMPTION,
EXCEPTIONS, AND DEFINITION OF CARETAKING

A.

The Presumption and Its Exceptions

Responding to the call for a rule that can be applied automatically
and that bypasses judicial discretion, the Principles adopts an idea
first articulated in a seminal article by Professor Elizabeth S. Scott. 140
The proposal directs courts to look to the family's past to decide
contested physical custody cases: "[T]he court should allocate
custodial responsibility so that the proportion of custodial time the
child spends with each parent approximates the proportion of time
each parent spent perfonning caretaking functions for the time prior
to the parents' separation .... "141 The same sentence that sets out the
approximation rule continues with elaborations that expand the
court's discretion, and two paragraphs later, the Principles
reintroduces an indetenninate best-interest standard, albeit with an
emphasis on past caretaking. 142 Such elaborations fulfill Professor
138. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2231.
139. Elster, supra note 44, at 24-25 (explaining that a maternal-preference rule would
benefit children who would do best in the custody of their mother, as well as those
who should be in the custody of their father but for whom the emotional toll of
custody litigation would outweigh the benefits of a father-custody disposition).
140. Scott, supra note 42, at 617-19, 630, 637-38.
141. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1).
142. Id. § 2.08(3) ("If the court is unable to allocate custodial responsibility under
Paragraph (I) because there is no history of past performance of caretaking functions,
as in the case of a newborn, or because the history does not establish a sufficiently
clear pattern of caretaking, the court should allocate custodial responsibility based on
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Schneider's prediction, twenty-one years earlier, regarding the
attempt to abandon discretion in custody adjudication: "We will see
that, once you establish an apparently flat rule like the primary
caretaker standard, you immediately run into conflicting interests and
arguments that can only be accommodated by writing ever more
elaborate rules or by conceding judges some discretion.,,143
The past-caretaking presumption is overcome as needed to fulfill
at least one of the following objectives enumerated by the Principles:
(a) to permit the child to have a relationship with each
parent which, in the case of a legal parent or a parent by
estoppel who has performed a reasonable share of parenting
functions, should be not less than a presumptive amount of
custodial time set by a uniform rule of statewide
application;
(b) to accommodate the firm and reasonable preferences
of a child who has reached a specific age, set by a uniform
rule of statewide application;
(c) to keep siblings together when the court finds that
doing so is necessary to their welfare;
(d) to protect the child's welfare when the presumptive
allocation under this section would harm the child because
of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional
attachment between each parent and the child or in each
parent's demonstrated ability or availability to meet the
child's needs;
(e) to take into account any prior agreement, other than
one under § 2.06, that would be appropriate to consider in
light of the circumstances as a whole, including the
reasonable expectations of the parties, the extent to which
they could have reasonably anticipated the events that
occurred and their significance, and the interests of the
child;
(f) to avoid an allocation of custodial responsibility that
would be extremely impractical or that would interfere
substantially with the child's need for stability in light of
economic, physical, or other circumstances, including the
distance between the parents' residences, the cost and
difficulty of transporting the child, each parent's and the
the child's best interests, taking into account the factors and considerations that are set
forth in this Chapter, preserving to the extent possible this section's priority on the
share of past caretaking functions each parent performed.").
143. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2283.
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child's daily schedules, and the ability of the parents to
cooperate in the arrangements;
(g) to apply the Principles set forth in § 2.17 (4) if one
parent relocates or proposes to relocate at a distance that
will impair the ability of a parent to exercise the
presumptive amount of custodial responsibility under this
section ,.144
(h) to avoid substantial and almost certain harm to the
child. 145
The application of the approximation rule, with its exceptions, is
further limited by the requirements of § 2.11 to protect the child and
the child's parent from domestic violence and other serious parental
failures. 146 The other serious parental failures include child abuse,
substance abuse, and persistent interference with a parent's access to
the child. 147
B.

Parenting Versus Caretaking Functions

To evaluate the approximation-rule proposal and its chances of
achieving widespread acceptance, it is essential to understand what
the Principles includes and excludes from the definition of caretaking
functions. 148 Tasks that are regarded as parenting functions but
excluded from caretaking functions (i.e., a parent's investment in
these tasks has no bearing on the allocation of physical custody)
include
(a) providing economic support;
(b) participating in decisionmaking regarding the child's
welfare;
(c) maintaining or improving the family residence,
including yard work, and house cleaning;
(d) doing and arranging for financial planning and
organization, car repair and maintenance, food and clothing
purchases, laundry and dry cleaning, and other tasks

144. See generally PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2. 17(4)(a) ("The court should allow a parent
who has been exercising the clear majority of custodial responsibility to relocate with
the child if that parent shows that the relocation is for a valid purpose, in good faith,
and to a location that is reasonable in light of the purpose.").
Id. § 2.08(1).
See id. § 2.11.

145.
146.
147. Id.§2.11(1).
148. See id. § 2.08(1).
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supporting the consumption and savings needs of the
household. 149
Parenting functions that are considered caretaking functions for
the purpose of the approximation rule (i.e., the proportion of time a
parent invested in these activities serves as the basis for the allocation
of custodial time with the child) are
tasks that involve interaction with the child or that direct,
arrange, and supervise the interaction and care provided by
others. Caretaking functions include but are not limited to
all of the following:
(a) satisfying the nutritional needs of the child, managing
the child's bedtime and wake-up routines, caring for the
child when sick or injured, being attentive to the child's
personal hygiene needs including washing, grooming, and
dressing, playing with the child and arranging for recreation,
protecting the child's physical safety, and providing
transportation;
(b) directing the child's various developmental needs,
including the acquisition of motor and language skills, toilet
training, self-confidence, and maturation;
(c) providing discipline, giving instruction in manners,
assigning and supervising chores, and performing other
tasks that attend to the child's needs for behavioral control
and self-restraint;
(d) arranging for the child's education, including
remedial or special services appropriate to the child's needs
and interests, communicating with teachers and counselors,
and supervising homework;
(e) helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate
interpersonal relationships with peers, siblings, and other
family members;
(f) arranging for health-care providers, medical followup, and home health care;
(g) providing moral and ethical guidance;
(h) arranging alternative care by a family member,
babysitter, or other child-care provider or facility, including
investigation of alternatives, communication with providers,
and supervision of care. ISO

Id. § 2.03(6).
150. Id. § 2.03(5).

149.
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VIII. THE APPROXIMATION RULE: GOALS, RATIONALE,
AND ASSUMPTIONS
A.

Default Rulefor Trials, BA TNA for Negotiations

The Principles emphasizes that the approximation rule is a default
rule to be used only in disputes decided by a court. 151 As with the
best-interest standard, the approximation rule would provide a
backdrop for negotiations. 152 In fact, the Principles explicitly
encourages parents to reach agreements within the negotiating
context set by the approximation rule. 153 If the rule works as
intended, it would have the following impact on the settlement
process. The approximation rule would tilt negotiations regarding
custody, and issues related to custody such as child support, in favor
of the parent who is asking for a division of the child's time that is in
line with the apparent past division of time. For instance, if the
mother seeks a majority oftime with the children and the father seeks
an equal division of time, and both sides agree that the court is likely
to find that the parents contributed equal time to caretaking functions
in the past, this would give leverage to the father in the negotiations.
On the other hand, the rule disadvantages spouses who want to
expand their contacts with their children after the marital
separation. 154
For the approximation rule to have the intended impact on the
bargaining context, two assumptions must be made. The first
assumption is that the parties will agree on the proportion of time that
each has contributed to the caretaking tasks defined by the Principles,
or at least agree on how the court is likely to decide this issue. The
second assumption is that neither party to the custody dispute will
raise any of the exceptions that trump the application of the
approximation rule.
These assumptions are examined in the
subsequent analysis of the rationale presented by the Principles for
the proposed reforms.

151. See id. ch. 1, topic 1, at 8-10.
152. ld. § 2.08 cmt. a ("This section states the criteria for allocating custodial responsibility
between parents when they have not reached their own agreement about this
allocation. These criteria also establish the bargaining context for parents seeking
agreement.").
153. ld.
154. Levy, supra note 11, at 76.
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Refinement or Replacement of the Best-Interest Standard?

Despite its explicit intent to dislodge the best-interest standard and
substitute a past-caretaking standard, the Principles characterizes the
approximation rule as a clarification and refinement, rather than a
radical reform and replacement, of the best-interest standard. 155
The historical context provided earlier identifies two essential
defining features that differentiate the best-interest standard from its
predecessors. First, it places a priority on children's welfare over
parental entitlements. 156 Second, it confers broad discretion on the
court, a discretion that, since the latter third of the twentieth century,
is usually exercised via a multi-factored individualized inquiry as
originally envisioned in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act. 157
The approximation rule shares the first defining characteristic of
the best-interest standard: its primary objective is "to serve the child's
best interests,,,158 with a subsidiary objective of achieving "fairness
between the parents.,,159 But it directly contradicts the second
defining characteristic of the best-interest standard: judicial discretion
with the intent to promulgate individualized custody decisions. 160
Rather than lodging broad discretion with the court, the
approximation rule overtly aims to limit the court's discretion and
restrict the process of custody adjudication to a single desideratum. 161
Lacking the second defining feature of the best-interest standard, it is
conceptually untenable to attach this term to a rule that is its
conceptual opposite. Fundamentally, the approximation rule does not
supplement the best-interest standard. It supplants it.
ALI posits the approximation rule as a more reliable means of
securing children's welfare, and, thus, it is understandable that we are
asked to regard the rule as possessing the moral cachet associated
with the best-interest standard. 162 But the virtue of the prevailing
standard is found in its individualized, as opposed to formulaic,
treatment of children and families. The approximation rule forfeits
its claim to this virtue because it does not merely clarify or refine the
level of judicial discretion that secures the virtue; it severely restricts

155.

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.

PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 emt. e ("Chapter 2 attempts to clarify and refine the
best-interests standard rather than to eliminate it.").
/d. § 2.02(2) emt. b.
Id. § 2.02(1).
Id.
Id. § 2.02(2).
Id. § 2.02 emt. c.
Id.
Id. §§ 2.02 cmt. d, 2.06 (1), (3).
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it. 163 This does not mean that the approximation rule lacks virtue.
But whatever virtues the rule may possess, an individualized broadbrush approach for adjudicating custody disputes is not one of them.

e.

Rationale

The approximation rule improves upon earlier custody
presumptions in two important respects. It is gender-neutral rather
than gender-centered. l64 And instead of imposing one template on all
families, the approximation rule is pluralistic, in the sense that each
family's custodial allocation is based on its own historical pattern of
caretaking. 165 As the Principles' reporter notes:
In effect, it amounts to a primary caretaker presumption
when one parent has been exercising a substantial majority
of the past caretaking, and it amounts to a joint custody
presumption when past caretaking has been shared equally
in the past. It responds to all variations and combinations of
past caretaking patterns between those two poles, declining
to impose some average, idealized family form on all
families and instead favoring solutions that roughly
approximate the caretaking shares each parent assumed
before the divorce or before the custody issue arose. 166
The Principles regards the approximation rule as an optimal
solution to the problems critics attribute to the discretionary nature of
the best-interest standard. 167 Furthermore, the hope is that the rule
will be palatable to interest groups that take an ever-increasingly
powerful role in shaping family law legislation. 168 In addition to
gender-neutrality and pluralism, the Principles offers several
arguments for relying on past caretaking:
1) The amount of time invested in past caretaking is a determinate
standard that makes the outcome of a custody trial more
predictable. 169 This makes it more likely that parents will reach an

163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Jd.
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 480-81.
Jd. at 479-80.
Jd. at 480; see also Atwood, supra note 94, at 126 (discussing the rule's pluralism).
Bartlett, supra note 6, at 482.
See id. at 472.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
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agreement without the financial and emotional costs of a trial. 170 It is
commonly believed that custody litigation escalates conflict, so the
hope is that a determinate standard will ultimately benefit children by
reducing their harmful exposure to parental conflict. 171
2) The approximation rule not only promotes settlements, it
creates a clear BATNA that facilitates less protracted and more
amicable negotiations with less opportunity for strategic,
manipulative bargaining. 172
3) In cases that fail to settle, the approximation rule reduces the
complexity and length of trials by restricting the scope of fact-finding
to a single, relatively easy to measure, factor. 173 This reduces the
need for costly, comprehensive custody evaluations and expert
witnesses. 174 Revealing a jaundiced view of the contributions of
mental health experts to custody litigation, the ALI believes,
"Avoiding expert testimony is desirable because such testimony,
within an adversarial context, tends to focus on the weaknesses of
each parent and thus undermines the spirit of cooperation and
compromise necessary to successful post-divorce custodial
arrangements .... "175
4) The parents' past decision about how to divide caretaking time
is the best guide to what the parents would decide if they were
functioning rationally and focused on their child's interests during
their custody negotiations. 176 Additionally, the approximation rule
facilitates effective negotiations because "[t]he way the parents chose
to divide responsibility when the family lived together anchors the
negotiations in their own lived experience rather than in unrealistic or
emotion-based aspirations about the future.,,177
5) The Principles recognizes that any determinate standard carries
the potential to simplify, expedite, and reduce the incidence of trials
and protracted negotiations. 178 The goal, though, is to obtain a
determinate standard's benefits while retaining a focus on children's
welfare. 179 The Principles believes that the approximation rule
170. Bartlett, supra note 85, at 19 ("[T]he past caretaking standard makes it easier for
parents to predict the outcome of a case and, thus, more likely to settle the case earlier
and more amicably.").
17l. See id. at 13, 19.
172. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
173. Jd.
174. See Bartlett, supra note 85, at 19.
175. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 emt. b.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. See id.
179. See id.
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accomplishes this elusive feat. 180 It assumes that the quantity of past
caretaking is an adequate proxy for qualitative aspects of children's
best interests that are difficult to measure. 181 Specifically, the
Principles assumes that the difference between the parents in the
amount of time that each cared for the child in the past is an index of
the difference in 1) the strength of the child's emotional ties to each
parent, 2) the quality of the child's relationship with each parent, 3)
the parents' relative competence to raise children, and 4) the parents'
motivation to put the child's interests first. 182 The Principles
recognizes limitations of this index, but prefers a rule to the
prevailing standard in which expert testimony and judicial discretion
are seen as intolerably subjective. 183
If the assumptions underlying the approximation rule were
accurate, there is no doubt that the rule would represent a childfriendly improvement on the best-interest standard. But seen in the
light of relevant social science literature and a realistic view of the
socio-Iegal context of custody disputes, it becomes clear that the
approximation rule will not-indeed cannot-deliver on its promises.
IX. ANALYZING THE RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS OF
THE APPROXIMATION RULE

A.

Gender-Neutrality Versus the Perception of Gender Bias

Regardless of how beneficial a legal reform would be in practice,
it must be politically palatable if it is to enjoy acceptance by state
legislatures and application by courts. Discussing the anemic judicial
response to West Virginia's legislated approximation rule, Professor
Sanders observes that, "The success of the standard will also depend
upon the support of various interest groupS.,,184 The approximation
rule was conceived as a rapprochement between the primary
180. See id.
181. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b.
182. Id. ch. 1, topic 1, subch. II, pt. c ("How caretaking was divided in the past provides a
relatively concrete point of reference which is likely to reflect various qualitative
factors that are otherwise very hard to measure, including the strength of the
emotional ties between the child and each parent, relative parental competencies, and
the willingness of each parent to put the child's interests first."); see also id. § 2.08
cmt. b ("It assumes that the division of past caretaking functions correlates well with
other factors associated with the child's best interests, such as the quality of each
parent's emotional attachment to the child and the parents' respective parenting
abilities. ").
183. See id.
184. Sanders, supra note 135, at 26.
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caretaker presumption advocated by mothers' rights groups and a
joint custody presumption advocated by fathers' rights groups. 185
Like the best-interest standard, the approximation rule is gender-blind
in its language. 186 But as history has shown with the best-interest
standard, gender-neutral statutes can be implemented in a genderbiased manner.
In evaluating its political viability, it is relevant that most
commentators, including advisers to the ALI Principles, are
convinced that the rule would tilt the negotiating field and trial
outcome in favor of the mother. 187 Recalling Schneider's suggestion
that proposals to restrict judicial discretion in custody cases are
motivated by the desire for a particular outcome, and given the
legislative trend toward joint custody statutes, the approximation rule
may be seen as a move in the direction of reversing the trend and
establish a bargaining context that favors mothers, in addition to its
goal of reducing indeterminacy.188 If so, Professor Guggenheim's
analysis of the primary caretaker presumption may fit the
approximation rule: "The primary caretaker presumption was offered
as a gender-neutral way to achieve the same result the maternal
preference yielded. Its transparency was hard to miss. It was
promulgated by interested parties who knew ahead of time who
would benefit most by its use.,,189 Guggenheim predicts "that more
women will back the approximation presumption than men. Women
will appreciate how they will gain if the presumption became law;
men will understand how they will lose both leverage in negotiating a
divorce settlement and the prospects of securmg custody

See Scott, supra note 42, at 615-16, 628,630-32.
See SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 162, 167.
See, e.g., Shelley A. Riggs, Is the Approximation Rule in the Child's Best Interests? A
Critique from the Perspective of Attachment Theory, 43 FAM. CT. REv. 481, 489
(2005) ("[B]ecause the working parent in contemporary society is most often the
father, the approximation rule may be unfairly biased against fathers and end up
resembling little more than the maternal preference standard of the past."); Herma Hill
Kay, No-Fault Divorce and Child Custody: Chilling Out the Gender Wars, 36 FAM.
L.Q. 27,43 (2002) ("[The Principles'] list of caretaking functions ... is likely to spell
mother in many, if not most, households."); Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child
Custody Under Chapter Two of the American Law Institute's Principles of the Law of
Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'y 301, 302, 313 (2001) (declaring
that "feminist principles permeate the Chapter" and including an entire section on
"selling" the ALI PRINCIPLES to men).
188. Cf Kay, supra note 187, at 38. This esteemed scholar and adviser to the PRINCIPLES
believes that the rule was "crafted by women" as an alternative to joint custody, which
they perceive as the "handiwork of men." Id. at 27,38.
189. GUGGENHEIM, supra note 1, at 150.

185.
186.
187.
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themselves.,,19o Professor Levy groups the approximation rule with
the primary caretaker standard and the maternal deference standards
as proposals "which seem to route the law implicitly in the direction
of the maternal presumption of earlier days.,,191
The charge that the approximation rule masks a maternal
preference presumption is answered by the primary draftsperson and
reporter of the Principles' chapter on custody, Professor Kathleen
Bartlett: "A parent who obtains a greater share of custodial time
because of a more extensive prior role as the caretaking parent does
so not because of the court's gender bias but because of the parents'
own past choices about the best way to care for the child.,,192
Other proponents of the approximation rule correctly point out that
it would benefit fathers who assume more responsibility for childcare during the marriage, in some cases allocating more time than
they would receive under the best-interest standard. 193 Emery cites
190. Jd. at 151. However, to be most accurate, we should not equate the interests and
preferences of mothers in a custody dispute with those of all women. Women in the
father's life other than the divorcing spouse, such as his mother, sisters, and friends,
may favor a standard that gives the father more time with his children. Also, some
women who identifY themselves as feminists favor custody rules that encourage less
traditional gender-based divisions of parenting roles. See, e.g., CATHY YOUNG,
CEASEFIRE!: WHY WOMEN AND MEN MUST JOIN FORCES TO ACHIEVE TRUE EQUALITY
211,213,217-19 (1999).
191. Levy, supra note 11, at 88.
192. Bartlett, supra note 6, at 481; see also Katharine T. Bartlett, u.s. Custody Law and
Trends in the Context of the ALI Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 10 VA.
J. SOC. POL'y & L. 5, 18 (2002) ("The ALI past-caretaking standard ... is indifferent
to the nature of the past-caretaking arrangements."). In Richard A. Warshak, The
Approximation Rule, Child Development Research, and Children's Best Interests
After Divorce, 1 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 119, 123 (2007) and in Warshak, supra note 16,
at 618 n.67, I mistakenly cited this quote to emphasize the rule's disregard of quality
of care in favor of an exclusive focus on quantity of care. However, upon reviewing
the context while preparing this article, it is clear that this particular statement
regarding indifference is intended to underscore the fact that the rule makes no
assumptions about the nature of past divisions of child-care. Although, as [ show
subsequently, the rule is indifferent to the quality of care except in the extreme cases
of child abuse or neglect, the indifference referred to in the above sentence clearly has
a separate connotation. See also Atwood, supra note 94, at 127 ("[the approximation
rule] will favor women only to the extent that parents adhere to traditional gender
roles.").
193. Atwood, supra note 94, at 126; see also O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130 (noting that
the approximation rule would reward the increasing number of fathers in dual-earner
households who provide primary child-care); Fabricius et ai., supra note 34, at 213.
In a representative sample of Arizona citizens who responded to a hypothetical
custody case in which the mother and father provided equal amounts of child-care
before the divorce, more than 75% thought that courts would award mothers most of
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national survey data to predict that the approximation rule would give
the average father more than 120 nights annually with his children,
the equivalent of joint physical custody. 194
I include this brief discussion of gender implications because the
subject invariably arises when the merits of the approximation rule
are debated and, the issue is important in assessing the odds of the
rule's widespread adoption. But the question of whether the
approximation rule is likely to become law need not distract us from
the focus of this article, which is whether the rule should become law.
The answer to this question lies not in whether mothers or fathers
benefit from the past caretaking standard, but whether children
benefit. This topic we take up next, examining each of the main
arguments offered in defense of the approximation rule:
1) Will the rule reduce the incidence, scope, and complexity
of trials? 195
2) Will the rule minimize the motivation for manipulative
and hostile bargaining?196
3) Will the rule secure the custodial arrangements that
parents would agree to if they were functioning rationally in
accord with child-rearing choices they made in the past?197
4) Most importantly, is the quantity of past caretaking a
sufficient index of qualitative factors
associated
with
children's best interests?198

B.

Impact of the Approximation Rule on Custody Trials

ALI believes that the approximation rule will result in less
frequent and less complicated litigation with less judicial discretion
than under the best-interest standard. 199 ALI's charge that the bestinterest standard encourages custody trials (and the corollary
expectation that the rule will reduce their incidence)200 is difficult to
defend. No national data exist on the rate at which custody is decided
by trial versus settlement. The best available evidence from which to
extrapolate reveals a very high settlement/low litigation rate under
the parenting time. ld. In this hypothetical, parenting time would be equally divided
under the approximation rule.
194. Emery, supra note 45, at 134.
195. See infra pp. 124-37 and accompanying notes.
196. See infra pp. 137-39 and accompanying notes.
197. See infra pp. 139-42 and accompanying notes.
198. See infra pp. 142-60 and accompanying notes.
199. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
200. See id.

2011]

Parenting by the Clock

125

the best-interest standard. A Stanford study of 1,124 families in
California found that custody was either uncontested or decided after
negotiations in 80% of the cases. 201 Most of the remaining cases
were settled through mandatory mediation (11%), or through
negotiations following a custody evaluation or prior to the
completion of a trial (7.5%).202 Only 1.5% of the cases proceeded to
a complete tria1. 203 Two additional studies report greater than 90%
rates of pretrial settlements.204
The high rate of out-of-court settlements leaves little room for
improvement and suggests that, contrary to the concerns of critics,
the best-interest standard allows most couples to reach agreements
rather than go to tria1. 205 Even proponents of the approximation rule
concede that ALI's assumption that the rule will reduce litigation (a
key rationale offered for the proposal) is unrealistic. As Professor
Mary E. O'Connell writes, "[C]hanging the law to decrease this
already low litigation rate is of dubious value. ,,206
Experience with other attempts to replace the best-interest
standard with a clear-cut default rule have not delivered the hoped for
reduction in litigation rates. 207 A primary-caretaker preference in
Minnesota produced "a frenzy of litigation" that two authors who
support the preference attribute to an overly loose and flexible
application?08 Similarly, Oregon's experience with a default joint
custody presumption led to unanticipated consequences, such as

201.
202.
203.
204.

205.

206.

207.

208.

MACCOBY & MNOOKIN, supra note 82, at 137.
ld.
ld.
BRAVER & O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 90-91 (reporting that 5% of a random
sample of divorcing parents took their dispute to court); Logan et al., Divorce,
Custody, and Spousal Violence, supra note 135, at 275 (reporting that 9% of a random
sample of divorce cases with children were decided in a trial).
It is possible that the low contest rate reflects, in part, the operation of an implicit
maternal preference rule held by parents and their attorneys, particularly when young
children and girls of any age are involved. See State ex rel. Watts v. Watts, 350
N'y.S.2d 285, 286-89 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (discussing past use of the maternal
presumption and mothers' reliance upon it).
O'Connell, supra note 45, at 130; see also Atwood, supra note 94, at 126 ("[T]he
ALI's presumption is unlikely to reduce litigation for those few couples who cannot
resolve matters on their own.").
See, e.g., Gary L. Crippen & Sheila M. Stuhlman, Minnesota's Alternatives to
Primary Caretaker Placements: Too Much of a Good Thing?, 28 WM. MITCHELL L.
REv. 677,682 (2001).
ld. at 681-85.
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increases in the number of abuse actions and post-divorce custody
motions. 209
It is possible that for some litigants the uncertainty of a trial's
outcome is a deterrent rather than an inducement to proceed to trial.
We should not assume, though, that a reduction in litigation rates
necessarily represents "improvement." Although the ordeal of a
custody trial undoubtedly takes a toll on the family, in some cases the
alternative may be less desirable, such as an emotionally healthy
parent capitulating to a seriously disturbed parent's demands in the
interest of avoiding a tria1. 2IO
There are two additional reasons why the approximation rule will
not make a significant dent in the existing low litigation rate and is
unlikely to simplify and expedite trials as envisioned by ALI. 1)
Under the best-interest standard, disputes over past caretaking are
common among custody litigants, and the Principles provides
additional fuel for such disputes.211 Furthermore, adjudicating such
disputes is more complicated than ALI acknowledges. 2) The
exceptions and circumstances that modify the approximation rule
provide plenty of focus for litigation with a high level of judicial
discretion. 212
1.

Disputes over Past Caretaking

Under the best-interest standard, parents who proceed to trial
usually do not agree on the proportion of their relative contributions
to past caretaking. 213 In the Approximation Rule Survey, 88% of
attorneys and child custody evaluators confirmed that, if the
approximation rule were operative, the litigants in their last custody
trial would have disputed the past division of caretaking functions
and still proceeded to trial. 214 The approximation rule could fuel a
higher rate of such disputes because it grants significant status and

209.

210.

211.
212.
213.
214.

See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Bargaining in the Shadow of Joint
Parenting 10-12 (Oct. 2005) (Univ. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No. 05-25),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=820104.
See, e.g., Logan, et aI., Divorce, Custody, and Spousal Violence, supra note 135, at
276 ("Settling out of court can provide an opportunity for a husband to coerce the
wife into accepting a lower financial payment in exchange for custody of the
children.").
See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
See Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 121.
See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
Warshak, supra note 12, at 25. It is possible that some respondents took the survey
with preconceived attitudes about the approximation rule and skewed their answers to
support these attitudes.
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prerogatives to the parent whom the court decides has spent the most
time performing past caretaking functions. 215
Although the Principles explicitly discourages an adversarial
divorce paradigm, it repeatedly describes the approximation rule as
requiring the court to "allocate primary custodial responsibility.,,216
The awarding of "primary" custodial responsibility to one parent
implicitly demotes the other parent to "secondary" status.217 Rank
ordering parents is likely to fuel discord, particularly at a time when
parents are struggling to preserve their identities as parents in the face
of the loss of their identities as spouses.218 Professor Schepard
regards this process as "reminiscent of the search for a single
psychological parent.,,219 Awarding primary custody is possible
under the best-interest standard, but other options also are possible
under this standard such as designating a parenting plan without
labeling either parent as primary.
Litigation over how much time each parent actually invested in
caring for the children, whose account of the childcare status quo is
most accurate, and, thus, who deserves recognition as the primary
custodial parent is especially likely if either parent anticipates a
future dispute over relocating with the child. In such cases, the
primary parent is in the driver's seat when it comes to the freedom 10
move a considerable distance away from the other parent with the
child. 220 The Principles' position on relocation is that "[t]he court
should allow a parent who has been exercising the clear majority of
215.
216.

See Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 121-23.
See, e.g., PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b, illus. I ("The past caretaking
standard requires the court to allocate primary custodial responsibility to Sandra. ");

see also id. § 2.08 cm!. c, illus. 5 ("That parent ordinarily will be allocated primary
custodial responsibility for the child."); id. § 2.08 cmt. c, illus. 5 ("[T]he court should

217.

allocate primary custodial responsibility to Marie."). In this illustration, Marie's
husband assumed the majority of childcare responsibilities for the entire year prior to
the separation, but not for the years prior to that. Id.
Warshak, supra note 16, at 604.

218. Id.
219.

220.

SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 169. The notion that children have only one
psychological parent has been discredited by a large body of evidence that
demonstrates that infants normally develop close attachments to both of their parents
and that they do best when they have the opportunity to establish and maintain such
attachments. See, e.g., BILLER, supra note 74, at 11-12; Michael E. Lamb & Charlie
Lewis, The Development and Significance of the Father-Child Relationships in TwoParent Families, in THE ROLE OF THE FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 280-81;
PARKE, supra note 74, at 47-48; WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY REVOLUTION, supra note
30, at 35-36; Brieffor Lamusga Children, supra note 76, at 5-6.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.17(4)(a).
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custodial responsibility to relocate with the child if that parent shows
that the relocation is for a valid purpose, in good faith, and to a
location that is reasonable in light of the purpose.,,221 With such a
premium placed on having the primary or majority of custodial
responsibility, and this designation riding on the single factor of how
much time each parent invested in caring for the children, one can
expect that this single factor will become a focus of dispute.
The Principles recognizes that disputes about past caretaking may
introduce difficulties in applying the approximation rule but expects
that disputes over the relative amounts of the parents' past child-care
are easier to resolve objectively than are those over the parents'
relative ability to meet their children's needs and the quality of their
child-care. 222 If this expectation were grounded in the practical
realities of parenting, the outcome of litigation might be more
predictable and the rule might accomplish its mission of reducing the
incidence of trials and simplifying the court's task when trials do
occur. However, tracking parental time devoted to children's care is
discouragingly complicated. 223 The difficulties in implementing the
approximation rule become evident in the following example.
A family in which the wife is a full-time homemaker and the
husband is employed outside the home might seem the easiest in
which to designate a primary caregiver. Allowing for variations, in
such families the husband typically leaves for work about an hour
before the child leaves for school. He returns home about two hours
after the child returns home. Assuming that there is no structured
after-school activity and that the child is not under the care of any
other adults during this time, such as dance instructors, music
teachers, and sports coaches (an unlikely assumption in many, if not
most, families of school-age children), in each school week the
mother has fifteen hours more than the father during which the child
is under her care (three hours a day * five days a week). Research
has established that less than two-thirds of this time involves direct
personal interaction between mother and child. 224 In fact, on a typical
weekday, children in intact families spend only an average of two

221.
222.
223.
224.

Id.
Id. § 2.08, cmt. a-b.
Warshak, supra note 16, at 609.
Id.; see, e.g., Steven L. Nock & Paul W. Kingston, Time with Children: The Impact of
Couples' Work-Time Commitments, 67 Soc. FORCES 59 (1988); W. Jean Yeung &
Frank Stafford, Intra-Family Child Care Time Allocation: Stalled Revolution or Road
to Equality? 22, 26, 61-62 (Jan. 2003) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
author).
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hours and fifteen minutes directly interacting with either parent. 225
Nevertheless, for the sake of argument, assume that the mother has
this fifteen-hour advantage during the school week.
The example becomes complicated, and the division of childcare
difficult to estimate, when it includes real-life permutations. If the
father coaches his child's soccer team, or attends the practices with
the child, this gives the father about two more hours of caretaking
each night of practice, assuming that some time is spent preparing to
leave the house and driving to and from the soccer field. However, if
the mother takes the child to soccer practice, this gives her two more
hours, unless she drops the child off at the field and has no contact
with the child until she picks her up at the end of practice. Add to the
equation inconvenient facts such as work holidays about one day per
month, overnight Scout camp-outs, and part-time jobs, and it is
apparent that the task of estimating caretaking time is not clear-cut.
Making matters even more complicated, parents often spend different
amounts of time with each child in the family. Multiply the difficulty
when the relevant time investments are in the past.
Sociologists who use sophisticated methods to track parental time
devoted to children find the task complex and daunting. 226 The
scientists dispute methods and findings, arguing issues such as to
what degree does a parent's being available to, as opposed to engaged
with, offspring qualify as caretaking?227 As Professor Michael E.
Lamb explains, "Involvement is a multifaceted concept that
comprises interaction, supervision, availability, and various types of
cognitive and emotional engagement .... ,,228 If the experts have
trouble agreeing on contemporaneous measures of parental childcare

225. Frank Stafford & W. Jean Yeung, Parental Childcare Time and Children's Cognitive
Development, ATUSUSERS.UMD.EDU (Oct. 19, 2007) http://www.atususers.umd.edu
Iwip2/papers_i2007IStafford_ Children. pdf.
226. Michelle Budig & Nancy Folbre, Activity, Proximity, or Responsibility? Measuring
Parental Childcare Time, in FAMILY TIME: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF CARE 51
(Nancy Folbre & Michael Bittman eds., 2004); Frank Stafford & W. Jean Yeung, The
Distribution of Children's Developmental Resources, in ECONOMICS OF TIME USE 289
(Daniel Hamermesh & G.A. Pfann ed., 2005); see also Fabricius et aI., supra note 34,
at 218-20.
227. Budig & Folbre, supra note 226; Stafford & Yeung, supra note 226; see also
Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 218-20 (describing complications in measuring
father-child contact, and concluding, "[n]ew measures of amount of parenting time
are needed that have good psychometric properties and that are sensitive to different
parenting time schedules").
228. Michael E. Lamb, The "Approximation Rule"; Another Proposed Reform that Misses
the Target, 1 CHILD DEV. PERSP. 135-36 (2007).
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time, surely parents in a custody battle, with so much riding on the
numbers, will dispute each other's estimates of past time invested in
caretaking. Unless parents have been punching time clocks every
time they interact with their children, and saving the time cards, this
will be one more arena for "he said/she said" arguments.
The example above highlights only the problems in measuring
what is observable about what each parent does with the child. Apart
from the extreme of severely harsh, abusive, and irrational parenting,
much of what goes on between parents and children is subtle and
indirect, neither immediately apparent nor easy to quantify. 229 Hired
help can perform the same chores as a parent, yet the parent's efforts
carry additional impact. 230 Parents who mow the lawn or clean the
house demonstrate to their children pride in the horne, responsibility,
discipline, delay of gratification, and maturity in completing work
before play.231 These values cannot be measured by the time it takes
to perform the chores. 232
Two of the caretaking functions that the Principles lists are
"helping the child to develop and maintain appropriate interpersonal
relationships" and "providing moral and ethical guidance.,,233 The
time each parent spent instilling social skills and moral values cannot
be reduced to the time each parent spent lecturing the child in these
areas (assuming that such time could be measured, which of course is
impossible).234
An axiom of child rearing is that children learn their lessons more
from what their parents do than what their parents say.235 When
parents work forty hours a week outside the horne, they demonstrate
important moral virtues, as do parents who mow the lawn or do the
laundry. 236
Empathy is the bedrock of successful high quality relationships,
for children and for adults. It is what partners in successful
relationships and effective therapists have in abundance and what
229.

230.
23l.

232.
233.
234.

235.
236.

See Stephen A. Small & Gay Eastman, Rearing Adolescents in Contemporary Society:
A Conceptual Framework for Understanding the Responsibilities and Needs of
Parents, 40 FAM. REL. 455, 455-57 (1991) (discussing the many different functions of
effective parenting).
See id. at 455.
See Mary Holland Benin & Debra A. Edwards, Adolescents' Chores: The Difference
between Dual- and Single-Earner Families, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 361, 361-65
(1990); Small & Eastman, supra note 229, at 457.
See Budig & Folbre, supra note 226, at 51, 63.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, at § 2.03 (5).
Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 122.
See Small & Eastman, supra note 229, at 457.

See id.
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serial killers lack. 237 A Yale University twenty-six-year study found
that the one factor most predictive of empathy in adults is growing up
with a father in the home.238 The study was conducted in an era when
the distribution of time the average child spent with her mother
versus her father was even more skewed than it is today.239 How does
one measure the amount of time that the father contributed to the
development in his children of this most critical personality trait?
A group of boys I call "the baseball bat kids" provide the last
example illustrating that the approximation rule is not only difficult
to implement, it is impossible.
I have treated several boys who slept with baseball bats under their
bed. This was not the reason they consulted me. But in the course of
our work together, either the mother mentioned it, or the boy
confided in me a concern about his behavior.
The baseball bat kids all lived with their mothers after their
parents' divorce, and were not seeing their fathers as much as they
wanted. In every case it wasn't until after Dad moved out of the
home that the baseball bat migrated to the place where monsters hide
when boys are little, and girly magazines hide when they're not so
little.
We can speculate that keeping the baseball bat close was
compensation for the absence of the parent most closely identified
with the sport. Or that the bat provided a sense of comfort through its
association with a relaxed and rewarding portion of the boy's life,
where the biggest worry was losing the game, not losing a parent. Or
that the bat represented a world far removed from domestic turmoil,
where conflict is encapsulated and expressed in a harmless and
entertaining manner, according to rules that are predictable and
consistently applied.
Speculations aside, according to the boys, their conscious
intention in parking the baseball bat under the bed was to keep it
handy for self-defense. Quite simply, when Dad left the home he

See John M. Gottman & Alan L. Porterfield, Communicative Competence in the
Nonverbal Behavior of Married Couples, 43 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 817,822 (1981);
Alan L. Sillars & Michael D. Scott, Interpersonal Perception Between Intimates: An
Integrative Review, 10 HUM. COMM. REs. 153, 167 (1983); ROBERT D. HARE,
WITHOUT CONSCIENCE: THE DISTURBING WORLD OF THE PSYCHOPATHS AMONG Us
(1999) (1993); Leslie S. Greenberg et ai., Empathy, 38 PSYCHOTHERAPY: THEORY,
REs., PRAC., TRAINING 380,382 (2001).
238. Richard Koestner, et ai., The Family Origins of Empathic Concern: A 26-Year
Longitudinal Study, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 709, 713 (1990).
239. Warshak, supra note 16, at 610.
237.
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took with him his children's sense of physical protection and
safety. 240
Herein lies a central problem with the approximation rule. How
do we measure the amount of time that a father devotes to providing
his children with an atmosphere in which they feel physically
protected? It cannot be done.
Given the extent to which litigating couples currently dispute each
other's account of past caretaking, and adding the Principles'
incentives for disputes over past caretaking and the difficulties in
objectively measuring this factor, it is reasonable to assume that the
approximation rule will fail to provide the more certain outcome that
significantly reduces the incidence of trials. Although focusing on
one factor may simplify the court's task, the task is far from
simple. 241
2.

The Exceptions Swallow the Rule

Even without the difficulties in determining relative contributions
to past caretaking, the exceptions to the approximation rule make it
unlikely that the rule will reduce the incidence, scope, and
complexity of trials, the extent of judicial discretion, or the

240. Id. at 611.
241. Laufer-Ukeles, supra note 126, at 53. Laufer-Ukeles argues that the approximation
rule is similar to a best interests inquiry in that
it is intensely factual and subject to dispute. . .. Nailing down
who has done what for what percentage of time over the course of
the marriage could be a difficult exercise, particularly in hostile
situations where custody determinations are highly contested ....
This inquiry could potentially bring the same indeterminacy and
fear of litigation that exists under the best interest standard.
Id. For a similar point regarding the primary caretaker presumption, see Levy, supra
note 11, at 71 ("Determining which parent was in fact 'primary' can cause as many
proof problems as the 'best interests' test."); Hoover v. Hoover, 764 A.2d 1192, 1194
(Vt. 2000) (underscoring the difficulty of adjudicating the amount of time spent in
caregiving). The appellate court in Hoover affirmed that the trial court record
supported the court's finding of fact that the father had "a slightly more active
engagement in the child's lives." Hoover, 764 A.2d at 1194. The "[t]ather testified
that he had dinner with the children every week night but Tuesdays and would then
help them with their homework before they returned to their mother's house for bed."
Id. at 1195. The dissent argued that "[t]irst and foremost, the court erred in its
findings related to how much time the children spent with each parent." Id. at 1197
(Johnson, J. dissenting). The dissent added that the trial court's finding "use[d] the
wrong measure of waking hours by looking only at the after-school hours rather than
at all the children's waking hours." Id. at 1198. As opposed to the trial court's ruling
and the appellate court's affirmation, the dissent calculated that the mother spent more
than twice as many hours in past caregiving than the father did. Id. at 1198.
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involvement of child custody evaluators. 242 The exceptions and
circumstances that modify the approximation rule (such as gross
disparity in parental abilities or availability, the preferences of a
child, domestic violence, child abuse, or interference with access to a
child) are the very issues central to most of the relatively few cases
that go to trial. 243 Professor Parkinson notes that the Principles'
exceptions are the rule in litigated cases. 244 It is likely that in cases
that go to trial, attorneys will mine exceptions to the approximation
rule and trigger traditional best-interest inquiries no different from
current practices. 245
The results of the Approximation Rule Survey support these
observations. Ninety-five percent of respondents reported that under
the approximation rule one or both of the litigants in their last
custody trial would have raised one or more of the exceptions to the
rule. 246 In the smaller subsample of child custody evaluators, 100%
reported that the approximation rule's exceptions were raised in the
last case they were involved in that went to trial and that enactment
of the approximation rule would not have caused the case to settle. 247
Litigants who believe that the past caretaking standard will work
against them are most likely to invoke one of the exceptions. 248 For
instance, the child's preference, if judged to be reasonable, is one
exception that trumps the application of the rule. 249 Could this
exception lead some parents to pressure their children to express
preferences for one parent and against the other? Such destructive
manipulation of children's affections occurs under the prevailing
best-interest standard. 250 But it may be even more likely under the
approximation rule because the Principles notably fails to include in
its list of exceptions gross disparities in each parent's support of the
child's relationship with the other, a factor common to many best-

See Warshak, supra note 16, at 604.
See id.
Parkinson, supra note 121, at 451.
See Smith, supra note 46, at 742 ("When discretion allows an exception to 'swallow
the rule,' then the rule is doomed to failure.").
246. Warshak, supra note 12, at 25.
247. See id.
248. Parkinson, supra note 121, at 450-51.
249. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(b).
250. See id. § 2.02 cmt. c.

242.
243.
244.
245.
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interest inquiries 2s1 that might discourage attempts to undermine the
child's relationship with the other parent. 252

251.
252.

See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 61.13(3)(a), (I), (r) (2009).
It might be argued that a parent who attempts to tum children against the other parent
would trigger one of the existing exceptions to the rule, such as a gross disparity in
each parent's demonstrated ability to meet the child's needs, see PRINCIPLES, supra
note 3, § 2.08(1)(d), or, in extreme cases, it might constitute persistent interference
with a parent's access to the child. See id. § 2.1 1(l)(d). Nevertheless, had the
PRINCIPLES included an explicit "unfriendly parent" exception, this might serve as a
disincentive to manipulate the children's affections. But see Dore, supra note 125, at
42, who views the "friendly parent" concept with alarm and argues that it encourages
conflict and prevents parents from protecting themselves and their children from
abuse, violence, and neglect because of the fear of losing custody if labeled a nonfriendly parent. This concern may have contributed to the conspicuous absence of an
unfriendly parent exception to the approximation rule. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3,
at 2.08 cmt. j, Reporter's Note ("Friendly parent provisions have been criticized on
the grounds that they disfavor a parent who may have good reasons for not wanting
the children to have significant contact with the other parent."); Linda D. Elrod &
Milfred D. Dale, Paradigm Shifts and Pendulum Swings in Child Custody: The
Interests of Children in the Balance, 42 FAM. L.Q. 381, 394 (2008) ("On one side
[friendly parent provisions] simultaneously protect against unwarranted withholding
of parenting time and frivolous allegations of abuse or unfit parenting, while on the
other side they may hinder reasonable inquiry into inappropriate or questionable
parenting practices if such inquiries are labeled 'unfriendly. "'). Rather than eliminate
a factor that clearly is associated with good parenting in the majority of families,
statutory and case law can qualify that a parent's support of the child's relationship
and contact with the other parent is not a factor to be considered in evaluating the best
interest of a child when a parent has good reasons to be concerned that such contact
would endanger the health or safety of either the parent or the child and is acting in
good faith to protect the child. E.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.090(6)(E) (2008).
Also, good faith opposition to joint legal or physical custody should not per se earn a
litigant the designation of "unfriendly parent." Just as some legal and mental health
professionals raise concerns about whether it is reasonable to expect divorced parents
to cooperate on joint decision-making, and about the potential destabilizing impact of
a child having two home bases rather than one, a parent can have the same concerns.
See supra notes 92-93. Even if these opinions ignore social science evidence,
children's preferences, or public policy in favor of joint custody, even if the opinions
reflect unwarranted bias against joint custody, such a bias addresses itself to the
structure of decision-making and the parenting time plan, and does not in and of itself
mean that the parent fails to support the child's healthy relationship with the other
parent.
One question that the court may consider is whether the parent is apt to comply with
court orders if these include joint custody provisions. The court may examine the
parent's behavior under temporary orders to assess whether the parent's opposition to
joint custody is reflected in behavior that fails to support, or undermines, the child's
relationship with the other parent, and whether the parent's behavior violates
temporary orders for joint decision-making or for the child's access to the other
parent. Even here, it is important to distinguish between a parent's initial and short-
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In addition to defeating the goals of reducing the incidence and
scope of litigation, the exceptions to the approximation rule open a
wide door for judicial discretion. Labeling the exceptions "escape
hatches," Professor Levy notes, "The exceptions to the rigid
'approximate the time spent' doctrine seem to give judges as much
discretion as the 'best interests' test does.,,253 Indeed, the three cases
where the West Virginia appellate courts referenced the
approximation rule statute all involved exceptions to the
approximation rule and triggered a best-interest analysis. 254
The exceptions also undermine the Principles' goal to diminish
the court's reliance on expert testimony.255 The value, limitations,
scope, and reliability of expert testimony are hotly contested in the
literature and are vital issues to explore. 256 But it is unclear how the
term responses fueled by emotions surrounding the marital separation and responses
that are likely to be more lasting.
253. Levy, supra note 11, at 76-77 (,"Consider the provision which requires the judge to
vary the custody award to 'protect the child's welfare when the presumptive allocation
... would harm the child because of a gross disparity in the quality of the emotional
attachment between each parent and the child or in each parent's demonstrated ability
or availability to meet the child's needs.' What good trial judge would not be able to
reach any outcome consistent with the judge's view of the facts and beliefs as to the
child's 'best interests?''') (alteration in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(d)).
254. In re Adoption of Jon L., 625 S.E.2d 251,253-55,260 (W. Va. 2005); Lindsie D.L. v.
Richard W.S., 591 S.E.2d 308,313-14 (W. Va. 2003); Marriage ofB.M.J. v. 1.D.J.,
575 S.E.2d 272, 276-77 (W. Va. 2002). Professor Sanders's analysis reveals that
West Virginia courts have virtually ignored the approximation rule legislation:
Instead of citing the current legislation, the courts have cited
Carter v. Carter, which held that '[i]n visitation as well as
custody matters, we have traditionally held paramount the best
interest of the child.' Decided in 1996, this case was before the
approximation standard was adopted. The Carter case has been
cited twenty-eight times for the use of the best interest of the child
standard since the legislature passed the approximation standard.
Sanders, supra note 135, at 25 (alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (citing
Carter v. Carter, 470 S.E.2d 193 (W. Va. 1996); Misty D.G. v. Rodney L.F., 650
S.E.2d 243, 245 (W. Va. 2007); Mary R. v. Billy D., 637 S.E.2d 618, 622 (W. Va.
2006)). Sanders argues that the PRlNCIPLES' authors use language in the exceptions,
such as "gross disparity" and "manifestly harmful" to signal their intention that the
exceptions will be applied rarely and only in the most exceptional cases. Id. at 22. In
view of West Virginia's experience, Sanders advocates creating more precise
guidelines for judges to allocate past caretaking, id. at 26, and refining the
approximation rule to reduce judicial discretion in its application. Id. at 26-27.
255. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b; Sanders, supra note 135, at 19-20.
256. See, e.g., Tippins & Wittman, supra note 99, at 193, 198,204. The same journal issue
contains eight commentaries on Tippins & Wittman and the authors' rejoinder to the
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approximation rule, with its exceptions, necessitates any difference in
the court's propensity to appoint experts.257 Although the Principles
favors custody adjudication without expert testimony, which it sees
as a costly and undesirable byproduct of the best-interest standard/ 58

257.
258.

commentaries. Id. at 218. For more on expert testimony, see Emery et aI., supra note
52, at 7; RICHARD A. WARSHAK, CUSTODY CONSULTATION WITH DIVORCING FAMILIES:
How TO AVOID THERAPEUTIC PITFALLS (BMA Audio Cassettes 1983); Daniel W.
Shuman, What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals to Say About "The
Best Interests of the Child"?: An Essay on Common Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of
Evidence, 31 FAM. L.Q. 551, 551,553, 566--67 (1997); WARSHAK, THE CUSTODY
REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 214-17; WARSHAK, supra note 90, at 298-301. See
generally Logan et aI., supra note 135 (reporting the results of a random sample of
custody evaluations in Kentucky, forty-six of which were classified as cases with
domestic violence, and concluding that custody evaluators did a poor job of
investigating and considering domestic violence issues in their procedures and
recommendations).
See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.13(1); see also id. § 2.13 cmts. a-c.
1d. § 2.02 cmt. c. Although expert child custody evaluations add to litigant's
expenses, if the evaluation assists in settling the case without a trial, it is possible that
such evaluations result in a net reduction of expenses. See W ARSHAK, THE CUSTODY
REVOLUTION, supra note 30, at 215. The PRINCIPLES offers no evidence to support its
skewed claim that expert testimony tends to focus on parental weaknesses. See
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.02 cmt. c. To the contrary, guidelines for custody
evaluators issued by professional organizations suggest the importance of a balanced
assessment of psychological factors relevant to the best interest of the child. See, e.g.,
American Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in
Divorce Proceedings, 49 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 677, 678 (1994) ("The values of the
parents relevant to parenting, ability to plan for the child's future needs, capacity to
provide a stable and loving home, and any potential for inappropriate behavior or
misconduct that might negatively influence the child also are considered.
Psychopathology may be relevant to such an assessment, insofar as it has impact on
the child or the ability to parent, but it is not the primary focus."); see also American
Psychological Association, Guidelines for Child Custody Evaluations in Family Law
Proceedings, AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 863, 864 (2010) ("Psychologists strive to identify
the psychological best interests of the child. To this end, they are encouraged to
weigh and incorporate such overlapping factors as family dynamics and interactions;
cultural and environmental variables; relevant challenges and aptitudes for all
examined parties; and the child's educational, physical, and psychological needs ....
The most useful and influential evaluations focus upon skills, deficits, values, and
tendencies relevant to parenting attributes and a child's psychological needs."); see
also Task Force for Model Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation, Model
Standards of Practice for Child Custody Evaluation, 45 FAM. CT. REv. 70-80
(2007). Similarly, learned treatises on custody evaluations describe procedures for,
and stress the importance of, assessing parental strengths. See RICHARD A. GARDNER,
FAMILY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY MEDIATION, ARBITRATION, AND LITIGATION
127 (1989); JONATHAN W. GOULD & DAVID A. MARTINDALE, THE ART AND SCIENCE
OF CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS 185-87 (2007); PHILIP MICHAEL STAHL,
CONDUCTING CHILD CUSTODY EVALUATIONS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE 80-81 (1994).
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it simultaneously recognizes the potential value of expert
involvement and explicitly grants courts the option of appointing
experts to assist the court. 259 The exceptions to the approximation
rule give courts as much reason to exercise this option as they have
under the best-interest standard. 260 For instance, when a parent
proffers a child's firm preference as an exception to the rule, the
Principles directs the court to determine if the preference is
"reasonable.,,261 To assist in its determination, the court may appoint
an expert to examine the reasons for the child's preference and the
maturity and independence of the child's judgment. 262
C.

Impact of the Approximation Rule on the Bargaining Process

Critics of a discretionary standard argue that uncertainty about the
likely outcome of a trial leads to more abusive and hostile
bargaining.263 Twenty-eight years ago Professor Schneider noted the
lack of empirical foundation for this assumption, and this lack has not
yet been rectified. 264 Thus, arguments about how legal presumptions
influence divorce negotiations must remain at the level of
speculation. Professor Schneider also observed the link between
judicial discretion and the range of freedom in negotiation: "The less
certain the litigants are what result a court would reach, the greater
the practical scope for bargaining: the clearer it is that a court would
reach a particular result, the less incentive the party who would
benefit from that result has to make concessions.,,265 We simply do
not know if presumptions would enhance the fairness of negotiations.
ALI anticipates that the approximation rule will reduce strategic
and manipulative bargaining because the rule is seen as establishing a
clear determinate criterion that will minimize the opportunity to use

259.

260.
261.
262.
263.

264.
265.

Also, the court can rely upon attorneys to elicit testimony from expert witnesses about
their client's strengths. GARDNER, supra, at 131.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.13 (I) ("The court may order a written investigation or
evaluation to assist it in determining any issue relevant to proceedings under this
Chapter. The court should specify the scope of the investigation or evaluation and the
authority of the investigator or evaluator.").
Id. § 2.13(1); see also id. § 2.13 cmts. a-c.
Id. § 2.08(1)(b).
See Richard A. Warshak, Payoffs and Pitfalls of Listening to Children, 52 F AM. REL.
373 (2003).
Schneider, supra note 46, at 2276 (quoting Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and
Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TuL. L. REv. 1165,
1170 (1986».
Id. at 2276-79.
Id. at 2278.
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positions on custody as leverage in bargaining financial aspects of the
divorce. 266 In addition to a potentially fairer outcome, this would
benefit children because pre-litigation maneuvers often exacerbate
parental conflict, which in tum can affect children adversely.267 As
shown above, though, the difficulties in measuring past caretaking
and the exceptions to the rule combine to make the rule less
determinate than ALI intends. 268
Only 25% of respondents to the Approximation Rule Survey
believe that the approximation rule would have reduced strategic and
manipulative behaviors during negotiation in their last case that
proceeded to trial. 269 These results suggest that a minority of
practitioners believe the rule would have the effect on negotiations
anticipated by ALL We need to know more about those cases that
might experience this benefit. It may be that in certain types of cases,
other legal presumptions that purport to reduce judicial discretion
would have a beneficial impact on the tone of negotiations. The
Approximation Rule Survey supports this hypothesis. Slightly more
respondents (28%) thought that manipulative bargaining would be
reduced with a presumption in favor of a school-year schedule
dividing the child's time between homes nine days/five days during
every two-week period. 270 This reflects what is known in Texas as
the extended Standard Possession Order.271 Attorneys who practice
in Texas and thus have experience with this presumption were even
more likely to credit it with reducing manipulations (37%) during
negotiations.272 A presumption in favor of an equal division of time
between homes was endorsed by 32% of respondents as likely to

266.

267.
268.
269.

Concern about trading time for financial concessions is expressed frequently. Garska
v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357,360--62 (W. Va. 1981) ("[U]ncertainty about the outcome
of custody disputes leads to the irresistible temptation to trade the custody of the child
in return for lower alimony and child support payments .... [Uncertainty is also] very
destructive of the primary-caretaker parent because he or she will be willing to
sacrifice everything else in order to avoid the terrible prospect of losing the child in
the unpredictable process of litigation."); see also Richard Neely, The Primary
Caretaker Parent Rule: Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. &
POL'y REv. 168,177 (\984); Chambers, supra note 93, at 499; Fineman, supra note
46, at 761; Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 57, at 971-73. But see Fabricius et at,
supra note 34, at 211 (arguing that empirical research fails to support this concern).
See Cassandra Brown, Comment, Ameliorating the Effects ofDivorce on Children, 22
J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 461, 462--64 (2009).
See supra Part IV.B.1-2.
Warshak, supra note 12, at 26.

270. Id.
271. See TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.311 (West 2011).
272. See Warshak, supra note 12.
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reduce manipulative bargaining. 273 Thus, although a minority of
respondents agree with ALI that the approximation rule would
improve the bargaining atmosphere, comparable numbers of
respondents attribute such a benefit to other custody presumptions,
and the majority of respondents believe that manipulative bargaining
tactics in cases that proceed to trial would be unaffected by any legal
presumptions. 274
One recent development in family law poses a special challenge to
critics who regard the best-interest standard as creating an
environment that encourages hostile, adversarial, negotiations and
litigation: the birth and spread of collaborative divorce. 275 Even if
collaborative divorce appeals to parents only because they fear the
uncertainty of a trial based on the best-interest standard, and not for
more benevolent reasons, the fact remains that an entire movement
opposing adversarial negotiations and litigation arose in the shadow
of the best-interest standard. 276 This directly contradicts the argument
that the best-interest standard necessarily results in hostile negotiating
environments and higher litigation rates.277
In addition to collaborative divorce, other law reforms, some
endorsed by the Principles, have been adopted within the context of
the best-interest standard and have helped to reduce the adversarial
process of custody decision-making. 278 These are discussed in a
subsequent section on contemporary applications of the best-interest
standard. 279
D. Implications ofParents' Past Decisions
The Principles assumes that "when parents do not agree, past
divisions of responsibility may be the most reliable proxy for the
shares of responsibility they would agree upon if they were focused
on their child.,,280 As the Principles explains:

273. Id.
274. Id.
275. PAULINE H.

TESLER, COLLABORATIVE LAW: ACHIEVING EFFECTIVE RESOLUTION IN

5, 179 (2001).
276. See id. at 179.
277. See Linda D. Elrod, Client-Directed Lawyers for Children: It is the "Right" Thing to
Do, 27 PACE L. REv. 869,900 (2007).
278. See Warshak, supra note 16, at 612-13.
279. See irifra Part X; see also Warshak, supra note 16, at 611-13.
280. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, ch. 1, topic 1, p!. II, em!. c.
DIVORCE WITHOUT LITIGATION
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[E]xpectations and preferences are often complicated at
divorce by feelings of loss, anxiety, guilt, and angerfeelings that tend not only to cloud a parent's judgment and
ability to make decisions on behalf of the child, but also to
exaggerate the amount of responsibility a parent wants to
assume for a child, or the objections he or she has to the
other parent's level of involvement in the child's life. The
way the parents chose to divide responsibility when the
family lived together anchors the negotiations in their own
lived experience rather than in unrealistic or emotion-based
aspirations about the future. 281
The divorce research literature supports the Principles'
observation that parents' decisions during a divorce often unduly
reflect strong, transient emotions rather than a rational appreciation of
their children's needs and of the likely consequences of various
alternative plans. 282 Bypassing the risk of irrational and uninformed
decisions is an important goal. Relying on the parents' division of
responsibilities during the marriage, though, is not necessarily the
best detour around these hazards. In some instances, the past division
of responsibilities does offer valuable guidance when formulating
optimal parenting plans; but in other instances, the past is a poor
index of what disputing parents would agree to if they were
functioning rationally and with a realistic view of the future. 283
Additional considerations, such as anticipated changes in parents'
availability to the children, are relevant to such decisions. 284
In addition, the Principles seems to regard past decisions in a
narrow and simplistic manner and fails to consider the context of past
parental decisions. 285 Consider the case of a woman who decides to
keep her job outside the home while her husband remains at home
with their infant for the first year of life. They discussed the
possibility of switching roles in the future, but had no understanding
of any specific time frame. After one year, the husband and wife
divorce. Should this mother now be locked into a schedule that gives
her relatively little time with her daughter for the next seventeen
years?286 When a couple decides on a homemaker-breadwinner
281. Id. § 2.08 cmt. b.
282. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605.
283. Id. at 605-06; see PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, §§ 2.02 cmt. d, 2.08 cmt. b.
284. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. h.
285. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605; see PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. d.
286. ALl might object that PRINCIPLES § 2.08 (1) (e)'s exception for prior agreements
covers this contingency. The exception is made in order
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division of roles, they are not necessarily making a long-term
agreement that one parent will give up outside career opportunities
and the other will spend less time with the children despite any
changes in their circumstances, including the loss of daily contact
with the children which accompanies divorce. Decisions made
during the marriage are choices about how responsibilities will be
divided in the present and given the current context, not how
responsibilities will be divided in the future and in contexts far
different from those of a harmonious marriage. Primary wage
earners in the family would most likely argue that the rule does not
apply to their situation because of the exception to the rule regarding
reasonable expectations. 287 They did not expect that their role as
wage earner would marginalize their postdivorce parental
prerogatives. 288
Further, one parent might spend less time with the children than
the other, not because the children are better off in the other parent's
care, but because the other parent acts as a gatekeeper, regulating the
scope and amount of contact that his or her spouse has with the
children. 289 Also, in unhappy marriages, one spouse commonly
escapes the tension of an unhappy marriage by spending more time
away from the home. 29o This reduces difficult interactions between
the parents and, consequently, the overt conflict to which the children
might be exposed. 291 Given such conditions, the choice to spend
more time with the children following the separation might be a

to take into account any prior agreement, other than one under § 2.06, that
would be appropriate to consider in light of the circumstances as a whole,
including the reasonable expectations of the parties, the extent to which
they could have reasonably anticipated the events that occurred and their
significance, and the interests ofthe child.
Id. Section 2.06 (1) (b) prohibits agreements that "would be harmful to the child."
The father in this scenario would undoubtedly argue that no prior agreement existed,
and even if it did, it would be harmful to interrupt the familiar pattern of caretaking.
This scenario illustrates the manner in which the exceptions to the rule undermine the
goal of increasing the predictability of the outcome of litigation. See also Warshak,
supra note 16, at 605.
287. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605; see PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08(1)(e). Id.
288. Warshak, supra note 16, at 605.
289. See Joan B. Kelly, Children's Adjustment in Conflicted Marriage and Divorce: A
Decade Review of Research, 1. AM. ACAD. CHILD. & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 963,
965 (2000).
290. See, e.g., id.
291. See id. at 963--66.
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rational decision rather than one anchored in "emotion-based
aspirations. ,,292
Other sections of the ALI Principles recognize that decisions
made in another context, prior to the contemplation of divorce, may
be poor guides to fair post-divorce outcomes. With respect to
premarital agreements, for instance, the Principles proposes:
The law's usual assumption that contracting parties are
capable judges of their own self-interest is put in doubt
when the judgment is so distant in time and circumstance
from its consequences.
This capability problem is
exacerbated by another uncommon feature of premarital
agreements: its principal terms speak exclusively to a
marital dissolution that the parties do not expect to occur,
and so the agreement has no expected application. Finally,
agreements are static, but relationships are not. The
agreement may have contemplated a relationship very
different than the one that the parties in fact later lived.293
It seems inconsistent for the Principles to allow such reasoning to
modify financial agreements, but not agreements about the division
of childcare tasks. 294 Indeed, the Principles recommends that courts
should limit the effects of past parental agreements for dividing
custodial responsibility rather than defer to such prior agreements:
"Prenuptial agreements are typically made in contexts, and with
respect to matters, as to which individuals are unable to predict and
assess realistically either the events that will happen in the future, or
the significance of the interests they are bargaining away.,,295

E.

Is Past Parenting Quantity a Proxy for Past, Present, and Future
Parenting Quality?

Traditional wisdom holds that the past is the best predictor of the
future. This may be true in the absence of knowledge about likely
future outcomes and in the absence of any significant change that
could alter established patterns. But when a substantial body of
social science research allows reliable predictions, society

292. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
293. Jd. ch. 1, topic 1, subch. I.
294. See id. § 2.08 cmt. i.
295. Id.
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shortchanges children if this knowledge is ignored in planning for
their futures. 296
1.

Promoting Stability and Continuity of Parent-Child
Relationships in the Face of Divorce-Related Changes in the
Family

Relying on the past for decisions about the present and the future
reflects a static view of family relationships; the Principles makes no
accommodation for the kinds of changes that are likely to occur in the
family after divorce and the effects that these changes may have on
parenting time. 297 Being a single parent is a very different challenge
from being one of two parents in the same home. For instance, after
divorce the average mother has less time and energy for her children
and more problems managing their behavior, particularly that of her
sons?98
Unless we regard custody as a reward for past deeds, the decisions
about parenting plans should reflect judgments about what
arrangements will best meet children's needs now and in the future.299
Differences in past performance are relevant only if they predict
differences in future parental competence and child adjustment. 300
But they do not.
The amount of contact in the past, prior to divorce, does not even
predict the amount of contact in the future, after divorce. 301 Among
the factors that account for this discontinuity are the following: 1)
most mothers who spent proportionally more time with the children
either reenter the workforce or work longer hours away from home,
See, e.g., David H. Demo & Alan C. Cook, The Impact of Divorce on Children, 50 J.
MARRIAGE & FAM. 619 (1988); William F. Hodges et aI., The Cumulative Effect of
Stress on Preschool Children of Divorced and Intact Families, 46 J. MARRIAGE &
FAM. 611 (1984); Kelly, supra note 289, at 963-73.
297. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. a.
298. See, e.g., Hetherington et aI., supra note 30, at 252.
299. SCHEPARD, supra note 61, at 168 ("The approximation presumption may also be
looked at as a return on investment in child-rearing, the legal system's reward for the
parent who spent the most time and energy caring for the child during the
marriage. . .. A custody award to a parent, however, should not be a form of indirect
compensation for time expended on child rearing. This argument is inconsistent with
the partnership theory of marriage, which generally prohibits the allocation of the
marital estate accumulated by the spouses according to their roles in creating the
wealth."); see also Richard A. Warshak, Gender Bias in Child Custody Decisions, 34
FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 396,404 (1996).
300. Warshak, supra note 16, at 606.
301. Id.
296.
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2) as children grow older, they spend more time outside the orbit of
their parents in school and with peers, and 3) the father can now
interact with the children apart from the backdrop of a tense marital
relationship, which, as discussed above, keeps some men in unhappy
marriages spending more time than they would prefer away from the
home and children. 302
The approximation rule makes no allowance for normal changes in
the proportion of mother's versus father's caretaking time. 303 In a
family with a homemaker-breadwinner division of roles, the
difference between the parents in proportion of parenting time is
much greater before than after the children begin elementary school
(unless they are home-schooled).304 For separations that occur when
children are pre-schoolers, the rule freezes the allocation of custodial
time at a level that maximizes the difference in the amount of time
the children spend with each parent. 305 A reduction in this difference
would occur only with the consent of the parent who is awarded the
most time with the children.306 The Principles fails to recognize that
even if the family were to remain intact, there would be a significant
reduction in the difference when the children entered elementary
school, and the relative amount of time each parent spends with each
child would most likely change over the course ofthe child's life. 307
The Principles values the importance of both parents, calls for a
minimum presumptive amount of parenting time, and asserts that the
approximation rule "is calculated to preserve the greatest degree of
stability in the child's life.,,308 Nevertheless, the Principles places a
clear priority on maintaining the stability of the child's relationship
with the parent who is designated the primary caretaker: "[T]he
parents' separation may make it necessary for them to change their
work schedules and rearrange other obligations. The inevitability of
such changes, however, makes it all the more desirable that there be
stability as to those matters the court can affect, especially the child's
302. Jd. at 606-07; see E. Mavis Hetherington, Coping with Family Transitions: Winners,
Losers and Survivors, 60 CHILD. DEV. 1 (1989).
303. Warshak, supra note 16, at 607.
304. Jd.
305. Jd.
306. Jd.
307. Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 122; see also Montenegro v.
Diaz, 27 P.3d 289 (2001) (No. S090699) (recognizing that children's needs change
over time and that custody arrangements should respond to such changes: "[T]he
changed circumstance rule should be flexible and should reflect the changing needs of
children as they grow up.").
308. PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08, cmt. b; Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra
note 192, at 123.
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relationships with the primary caretaker.,,309 This begs the question,
if stability is desirable, why not develop a parenting plan that
preserves the stability of the child's relationship with both parents?
Such a dual-parent focus is consistent with the section of the
Principles that defines children's best interests as including
"continuity of existing parent-child attachments" and "meaningful
contact between the child and each parent.,,310
In contrast, the best-interest standard assigns no priority to either
In some cases, a court-imposed
parent-child relationship.31l
residential schedule will resemble an approximation rule outcome. 312
In other cases, the schedule may increase the proportion of time with
a parent to accommodate postdivorce changes and to offset the loss
of daily contact. 313 The best-interest standard employs this flexibility;
the approximation rule does not. 314
The Principles' emphasis on preserving the child's relationship
with the primary caretaker may be influenced by research with
children in sole-custody arrangements. 315 In general, this research
reports a relatively high correlation between children's positive
adjustments after divorce and the psychological adjustments and
quality of parenting provided by the residential parents. 316 In
addition, some psychologists believe that children have a more salient
attachment to one parent than to the other. 317 Such findings should be
considered alongside research that documents the damage suffered by
children who experience a dramatic loss in frequency of contact with
their nonresidential fathers compared with the pre-separation daily
contact to which they were accustomed. 318 Also, studies begun in the
1950s and 1960s, when the division of caregiving time between
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08 cmt. b.
ld. § 2.02 (1); Warshak, supra note 16, at 607.
Warshak, The Approximation Rule, supra note 192, at 123.
ld.
Jd.
Jd.
Jd.
For a review of this literature, see Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 352, 354, 356,
358.
317. Zeynep Biringen et al., Commentary on "Blanket Restrictions: Overnight Contact
Between Parents and Young Children" 40 FAM. CT. REv. 204,-205 (2002). But see
Richard A. Warshak, Who Will be There When 1 Cry in the Night?: Revisiting
Overnights-A Rejoinder to Biringen et al., 40 FAM. CT. REv. 208, 210-11 (2002)
(highlighting significant flaws in the arguments made by Biringen et al.).
318. For reviews ofthis literature see Kelly, supra note 79, at 35-36, 43-44; Joan B. Kelly,
Developing Beneficial Parenting Plan Models for Children Following Separation and
Divorce, 191. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 237,237-38,240,242-43 (2005).
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mothers and fathers was more pronounced than in contemporary
times, show that long-term physical health risks are associated with
poor childhood relationships with fathers as well as with mothers. 3\9
Whatever its inspiration, the Principles' emphasis on past caretaking
time and on preserving the stability of the child's relationship with
one parent risks undermining its own declared value of the child's
relationship with both parents after the divorce, a value that has
widespread consensus among developmental researchers. 32o
The importance of preserving high-quality relationships with both
parents is highlighted by research that documents the deterioration of
postdivorce father-child relationships 321 and the benefits of greater
father involvement. 322 The literature is inconsistent regarding the
relationship between children's adjustment and frequency of contact
with fathers (which is different from amount and type of contact). 323
Better predictors of child outcomes are the amount of contact with
the father, the father's responsiveness to the child's needs, and the

319. These studies are reviewed in William V. Fabricius, Karina R. Sokol, Diaz & Sanford
L. Braver, Parenting Time, Parent Conflict, Parent-Child Relationships, and
Children's Physical Health, in PARENTING PLAN EVALUATIONS: ApPLIED RESEARCH
FOR THE FAMILY COURT, (Kathryn Kuehnle & Leslie Drozd, eds. Forthcoming 2012) .
320. See, e.g., Warshak et aI., supra note 76. The brief was endorsed and signed by
twenty-eight social science experts. Id. See infra text accompanying note 348 for a
consensus statement of eighteen experts. For more on the value of a child developing
strong relationships with both parents, see Michael E. Lamb, Kathleen J. Sternberg, &
Ross A. Thompson, The Effects of Divorce and Custody Arrangements on Children's
Behavior, Development, and Adjustment, 35 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 393,

393,400-01 (1997).
321. BILLER, supra note 74, at 1-2; HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 66, at 118-20;
Patrick Parkinson & Bruce Smyth, Research: Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction with
Father-Child Contact Arrangements in Australia, 16 CHILD. & FAM. LAW Q. 289,
289-304 (2004); Seth J. Schwartz & Gordon E. Finley, Mothering, Fathering, and
Divorce: The Influence of Divorce on Reports of and Desires for Maternal and
Paternal Involvement, 47 FAM. CT. REv. 506, 506-522 (2009); Zill et aI., supra note
74, at 91,96,100.
322. See, e.g., K. Alison Clarke-Stewart & Craig Hayward, Advantages of Father Custody
and Contact for the Psychological Well-Being of School-Age Children, 17 J. APPLIED
DEV. PSYCHOL. 239,260-63,265 (1996); Kelly, supra note 79, at 43-45; Kelly, supra
note 287, at 969; Lamb et. ai, supra note 320, at 400-01; Richard A. Warshak, Social
Science and Children's Best Interests in Relocation Cases: Burgess Revisited, 34
F AM. L.Q. 83, 90-94 (2000); Richard A. Warshak & John W. Santrock, The Impact of
Divorce in Father-Custody and Mother-Custody Homes: The Child's Perspective, in
CHILD. & DIVORCE 29, 38, 42-43 (Lawrence A. Kurdek ed. 1983); Warshak et aI.,
supra note 76.
323. Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Nonresident Fathers and Children's Well-Being:
A Meta-Analysis, 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557,557-559 (1999); Kelly, supra note 79,
at 44-45; Kelly, supra note 318, at 247.
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emotional quality of the relationship. 324 The benefits of father
involvement are most apparent when the mother values the fatherchild relationship, the children witness little overt conflict between
parents, and the father is reasonably well-adjusted, supportive, and
authoritative. 325 Other factors that mediate the impact of father-child
contact are the length of the contacts, the types of activities that
fathers share with their children, the extent to which transitions
between homes avoid exposing children to inter-parental conflict
(transfers can take place at a neutral location, such as a school,
without parents being in close proximity to each other), and whether
the contact disrupts the children's social lives and extracurricular
activities (which is more likely to occur with relocation).
Across studies, active involvement by competent divorced fathers
is linked to more positive adjustment in children, but an influential
1999 analysis of research revealed a relatively weak link between
frequency of contact and child outcomes such as depression,
aggression, and school performance. 326 This analysis led some
researchers to doubt the value of increasing the amount of divorced
fathers' parenting time.327 A closer look at the research shows
inconsistent results due to umeliable measures that confuse frequency
of contact with amount of parenting time. 328 Additional support for
giving greater weight to type of involvement than to frequency of
contact comes from a Department of Education survey of nearly
17,000 children. 329 Reporting an association between fathers' greater
participation in school activities and their children's better grades and
behavior, the study concluded, "[I]t is not contact, per se, that is
important, but rather other dimensions of involvement that go along
with contact that are beneficial to children's lives. "(ndeed, contact
324.
325.

326.

327.

BILLER, supra note 74, at Ill, 130, 190; Kelly, supra note 79, at 45.
Paul R. Amato & Sandra J. Rezac, Contact with Residential Parents, Interparental
Conflict, and Children's Behavior, 15 J. FAM. ISSUES 191, 192-93,205 (1994); Kelly,
supra note 79, at 41,45.
Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 13; Daniel N. Hawkins, Paul R. Amato & Valerie
King, Nonresident Father Involvement and Adolescent Well-Being: Father Effects or
Child Effects?, 72 AM. Soc. REv. 990, 990--91 (2007).
See, e.g., Hawkins, et aI., supra note 326, at 1003; Susan D. Stewart, Nonresident

Parenting and Adolescent Adjustment: The Quality of Nonresident Father-Child
Interaction, 24 1. FAM. ISSUES 217, 218 (2003).
328. Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 4-5.
329.

CHRISTINE WINQUIST NORD, DEEANN BRIMHALL & JERRY WEST, NAT'L CTR. FOR
Enuc. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF Enuc., FATHERS' INVOLVEMENT IN THEIR
CHILDREN'S
SCHOOLS, at
v,
75-76 &
n.30
(1997),
available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs98/98091.pdf.
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may be a mixed blessing if the contact is enough to tantalize children
but not enough to satisfy.'>33O
Recent studies find that college-aged children's relationships with
their father improve the more post-divorce time they shared, a benefit
seen up to and including the children having equal time with each of
their parents. 331 Not only does the long-term father-child relationship
improve with more parenting time, but this benefit takes nothing
away from the security of the mother-child relationship which
remains constant as fathers' parenting increases up to and including
equal time. 332
Because most custody arrangements are decided without a trial,
the question remains about the extent to which existing research data
serve as a useful guide in crafting a default rule for custody decisions
made by the court. 333 In particular, are the benefits to children of
increased parenting time seen in families with high inter-parental
conflict? Studies that measure frequency of contact rather than
amount of contact report mixed results. 334 Some studies report that
frequent father-child contact in high-conflict families is linked to
poorer child outcomes. 335 Some studies find no harmful effect of
330. Id. at 75-78 (footnote omitted).
A potential alternative explanation of the link between parenting time and emotional
security is that the amount of parenting time reflects the pre-existing quality of the
relationship. For instance, disinterested fathers might choose or be awarded little
time; highly committed and capable fathers might end up with more time. For data
that cast doubt on this alternative hypothesis, see Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at
13 (explaining that the evidence to date is consistent with the hypothesis that "amount
of parenting time exerts a causal effect on [father-child] relationship security.").
Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 214, view with skepticism the self-selection
explanation of the link between parenting time and subsequent emotional security.
They point to evidence that most children and fathers want more time together but
fathers are prohibited or dissuaded from obtaining additional time. Id.
332. See generally Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 225-27.
333. Id. at 210; Kelly, supra note 79, at 36, 40.
334. Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 228-29.
335. See, e.g., E. MAVIS HETHERINGTON, Should We Stay Together for the Sake of the
Children?, in COPING WITH DIVORCE, SINGLE PARENTING, AND REMARRIAGE 93,99 (E.
Mavis Hetherington, ed., 1999). The study most often cited in support of limiting the
court's discretion to impose more equally balanced parent-contact schedules for highconflict couples (which advocates sometimes equate with any couple who take their
custody dispute to trial) is Janet R. Johnston, Marsha Kline & Jeanne M. Tschann,

331.

Ongoing Postdivorce Conflict: Effects on Children of Joint Custody and Frequent
Access, 59 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 576, 588 (1989). See, e.g., In re Marriage of
Gayden, 280 Cal. Rptr. 862,865 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991); Matter of Adoption ofFranciso
A., 866 P.2d 1175, 1188 (N.M. 1993); In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419,
440 (Wis. 1995). Commentators often overlook the fact that, although Johnston et al.
report a link between frequent contact and negative outcomes in high-conflict
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frequent contact in high-conflict families. 336 One study finds negative
effects of frequent father contact for boys but not girls. 337 Another
study finds negative effects for girls but not boys.338 Other studies
report better child adjustment linked to more frequent father-child
contacts in high-conflict families. 339
One explanation for the inconsistent results is that some measures
of frequency of contact are proxies for frequency of child transfers
between homes. 34o Frequent transfers in the presence of two parents
who manage their conflicts poorly expose children to more tension. 341
Parenting time plans that more equally balance a child's time
between homes can reduce the likelihood of such harmful exposure 342
by scheduling longer blocks of time with each parent, which reduces
the number of transitions between homes,343 and by using locations

336.

337.
338.
339.

families, this result was restricted to sole custody families. See Johnston, et aI., supra
note 335, at 583-84. Children in high-conflict families who spent twelve to thirteen
days a month with their fathers did not have worse adjustments than those in sole
mother-custody homes. !d.
See, e.g., CHRISTY M. BUCHANAN, ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & SANFORD M. DORNBUSCH,
ADOLESCENTS AFTER DIVORCE 159-60 (1996); Margaret Crosbie-Burnett, impact of

Joint Versus Sole Custody and Quality of the Coparental Relationship on Adjustment
ofAdolescents in Remarried Families, 9 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 439,446 (1991).
See Amato & Rezac, supra note 325, at 200.
See Johnston et aI., supra note 335, at 585.
See, e.g., William V. Fabricius & Linda 1. Luecken, Postdivorce Living
Arrangements, Parent Conflict, and Long-Term Physical Health Correlates for
Children of Divorce, 21 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 195, 202 (2007); J. M. Healy, Jr., 1. E.
Malley & A. J. Stewart, Children and Their Fathers After Parental Separation, 60
AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 531, 541 (1990); Lawrence Kurdek, Custodial Mothers'
Perceptions of Visitation and Payment of Child Support by Noncustodial Fathers in
Families with Low and High Levels of Preseparation interparent Conflict, 7 J.
APPLIED DEV. PSYCHOL. 307, 320 (1986).
See e.g., Johnston et aI., supra note 335, at 588.
See Kelly, supra note 79, at 44-45.
See, e.g., id. at 45.

340.
34l.
342.
343. Longer blocks of time allow children a sense of living with each parent rather than

temporarily staying with them. But developmental psychologists caution that younger
children need shorter periods of time away from each parent. See, e.g., Kelly, supra
note 79, at 46 (citing Joan B. Kelly & Michael E. Lamb, Using Child Development
Research to Make Appropriate Custody and Access Decisions, 38 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 297-311 (2000) ("To maintain and consolidate attachments
formed with both parents prior to separation, it is important for infants and toddlers to
have frequent contacts, including overnights, with their adequate nonresidential
parents, without prolonged separations from either parent. ")). Marsha K. Pruett,

Applications of Attachment Theory and Child Development Research to Young
Children's Overnights in Separated and Divorced Families, in OVERNIGHTS AND
YOUNG CHILDREN: ESSAYS FROM THE FAMILY COURT REVIEW 5-12 (2005); Marsha K.
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and procedures for transfers that shield the child from tense exposure
to bickering parents, such as one parent taking a child to school in the
morning and the other parent retrieving the child in the afternoon. 344
Adjusting the structure and location of transitions to reduce the
child's exposure to conflict avoids the drawbacks of reducing
parenting time from what might otherwise be optimal for the child.
And reducing parenting time in response to conflict carries the
drawback of giving the wrong message to parents that generating or
sustaining conflict can be an effective strategy to override shared
custody. Also, a uniform policy of discouraging shared parenting
time when conflict is present overlooks the heterogeneity of the
dynamics of inter-parental conflict. 345 In weighing the implications
of conflict for custody dispositions, courts, operating under the bestinterest standard, can hear evidence that goes beyond identifying the
presence of conflict and sheds light on the dynamics of the conflict
and the contributions of each party to it. 346
Pruett, Rachel Ebling, & Glendessa Insabella, Critical Aspects of Parenting Plans for
Young Children, 42 FAM. CT. REv. 39-59 (2004); Richard A. Warshak, Blanket
Restrictions: Overnight Contact Between Parents and Young Children, 40 FAM. CT.
REv. 204-207 (2002).
344. E.g., Kelly, supra note 79, at 47 ("[B]ecause children typically love both parents,
reduced contact may not be the most beneficial solution. Instead, one searches for
arrangements and interventions that will reduce the conflict and its impact on
children. The presence of buffers that protect children from parental conflict should
be assessed and encouraged, transitions arranged that occur in neutral sites such as
school and day care, and mediation or parenting coordination interventions
implemented.").
345. See Braver et aI., supra note 34, at 212, 229, 232.
346. Several authors call attention to a common phenomenon in custody disputes where
one parent seeks to marginalize the other parent's relationship with the children, and
conflict is generated merely because the other parent refuses to accept being removed
from the children's lives. See, e.g., Joan B. Kelly, Parents with Enduring Child
Disputes: Multiple Pathways to Enduring Disputes, 9 J. FAM. STUD. 37, 38 (2003)
("[I]n as many as one third of entrenched parental disputes, several years after
separation or divorce, one parent is clearly the high-conflict parent. In these cases, the
other parent has emotionally disengaged and is being financially depleted and
emotionally abused by the continuing legal and child-focused conflict. The highconflict parent continuously pulls the other into legal battles through unending
petitions to the court, including repeated unfounded allegations, noncompliance with
orders, and inappropriate behaviors such as spying and harassment that require
remedy. The failure of professionals to differentiate these parents contributes not only
to the disengaged parent's stress and great frustration, but also fails to lead to
appropriate remedies."); Michael E. Friedman, The So-Called High-Conflict Couple:
A Closer Look, 32 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 101, 114 (2004) ("[Regarding conflict driven
by parents with borderline or narcissistic personality disorder, t]here seems to be
general agreement that the ex-spouses of narcissistically disturbed individuals can do
little to avoid a conflictual relationship short of acceding to their wishes. . .. [T]he
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Studies that measure amount of parenting time (more relevant for
evaluating proposals such as the approximation rule) as opposed to
frequency of contacts report consistent evidence that more parenting
time is not associated with poorer child outcomes in high-conflict
families and in fact strengthens parent-child relationships and may
protect children against some of the negative effects of exposure to
inter-parental conflict. 347
A 1997 review of research led to this consensus statement from
eighteen expert researchers:
To maintain high-quality relationships with their
children, parents need to have sufficiently extensive and
regular interaction with them....
Time distribution
arrangements that ensure the involvement of both parents in
important aspects of their children's everyday lives and
routines-including bedtime and waking rituals, transitions
to and from school, extracurricular and recreational
activities-are likely to keep nonresidential parents playing
psychologically important and central roles in the lives of
their children. 348

narcissistically disturbed parent is capable of essentially unilaterally creating and
maintaining post-divorce conflict."); id. at 116 ("When the concept of the highconflict couple is used to obscure what is really a conflict over custody/access and
used to weight the outcome of that conflict in favor of the parent creating it in an
attempt to exclude or marginalize the other parent, we have a serious miscarriage of
justice. . .. We lose opportunities to make interventions that may deescalate the
fight."). The court's reflexive assumption that all conflict is bilaterally instigated is
reflected in the bromide, "Mother Teresa does not marry Saddam Hussein." For a
critique of this assumption, see Richard A. Warshak, Stop Divorce Poison,
HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/richardwarshakistop-divorce-poison_b_778889.htmI. For evidence that the dynamics of
conflict affects how the public would allocate parenting time, see Braver et aI., supra
note 34, at 232-33, in which, when conflict and bad-mouthing is mutual, respondents
favor awarding equal parenting time, but when one parent typically initiates conflict,
respondents favor awarding a lot more time to the parent who refrains from fighting in
front of the children and bad-mouthing the former spouse and is the target of the other
parent's bad-mouthing.
347. For a review and results of a new study, see Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 24, 26,
28 (concluding that more parenting time is associated with better father-child
relationships for college students reporting frequent parent conflict and severe parent
conflict; cautioning against applying these findings to families where there is violence
or abuse).
348. Lamb et aI., supra note 320, at 400.
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Based on a more recent review, Kelly reinforces this expert
consensus: "[I]t seems apparent that children's contacts with their
adequate and interested fathers should occur during some part of each
school week, as well as on alternate weekends, resulting in, more
time with their children than has been possible with the alternating
weekend schedule.,,349
One problem with merely replicating the proportion of past
parenting time is that a relatively smaller percent of time being cared
for by a parent, when the parent and child live together full-time and
the child is around the parent every day, may be sufficient to give the
child an adequate sense of the parent's presence and involvement. 35o
But when the parent's daily presence is gone, the child may need
proportionally more time in order to sustain the sense of connection
and a feeling of living with, rather than visiting, a parent. 351 Because
of its exclusive emphasis on past caretaking, the application of the
approximation rule can result in decisions far removed from optimal
parenting time plans consistent with contemporary understanding of
the needs of children whose parents live apart from each other. 352
Studies of children living in joint-custody homes also support the
importance of stability of relationships with both parents. 353
Professor Bauserman's meta-analysis of thirty-three studies, with a
total sample of 1846 sole-custody and 814 joint-custody children,
reported better adjustments for children in joint custody compared
with those in sole custody, regardless of the level of parental strife. 354
349.

350.
351.
352.
353.
354.

Kelly, supra note 318, at 247; see also Fabricius et at., supra note 34, at 231 ("In the
typical family, more parenting time than the traditional alternating weekend visitation
is required to achieve the well-recognized benefits of two involved parents, each with
a close relationship to the child. An emerging consensus is that that a minimum of
one-third time is necessary to achieve this criterion and that benefits continue to
accrue as parenting time reaches equal (50-50) time."); Kelly, supra note 79, at 46;
Warshak et at., supra note 76, at 16 ("[T]he highest quality relationships are
maintained with access arrangements that promote a breadth of involvement between
parent and child. Though this may not be tied in a perfect linear relationship to the
frequency or amount of contact, the schedule of contacts does need to afford
opportunities for each parent's involvement in the child's daily life and routines,
including supervision of homework and chores, setting and enforcing limits, arranging
and supervising interactions with peers, and dealing with conflicts.").
See supra pp. 145-47.
See Kelly, supra note 318, at 237-40.
See supra pp. 142-5\.
See Robert Bauserman, Child Adjustment in Joint-Custody Versus Sole-Custody
Arrangements: A Meta-Analytic Review, 16 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 91, 99 (2002).
Id. at 93 (noting that the category of joint custody included joint legal custody and
joint physical custody, but both groups of children spent "a substantial proportion of
time ... living with each parent."); see also Mo-Yee Lee, A Model of Children's
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Advocates may wish to cite this research in support of replacing the
best-interest standard with a default rule dividing the child's time
between homes exactly equally, but most of the joint-custody studies
involved families in which the division of time between homes was
not necessarily equa1. 355
Public opinion polls and research show high levels of support for
equal parenting after divorce. 356 It is conceivable, though, that a
Postdivorce Behavioral Adjustment in Maternal- and Dual-Residence Arrangements,
23 J. FAM. ISSUES 672,691 (2002).
355. The Bausennan analysis was published in a top-tier, anonymous, peer-review
American Psychological Association journal, but it has been criticized. See, e.g.,
David A. Martindale, Diplomate in Forensic Psychology, Keynote Address at the New
York State Interdisciplinary Forum on Mental Health and Family Law 2011 Annual
Program: Imposed Joint Custody: Does it Work?, at 3-5 (May 14, 2011) (arguing that
the adjustment of children whose parents chose joint custody is irrelevant to
predicting adjustment when imposed by the court on one or both parents who sought
sole custody). Martindale hypothesizes that couples who voluntarily choose joint
custody have lower levels of pre-divorce conflict and that the lower conflict may be
the source of their children's better adjustment rather than the custodial arrangement.
ld. Beyond initial lower levels of conflict, it may be argued that the same factors that
playa role in parents' agreeing to joint custody may also contribute to the positive
outcomes in these families. ld. For convincing data that supports another view, see
BRAVER & O'CONNELL, supra note 30, at 194 (reporting that even when joint legal
custody (which approximated de facto joint physical custody) was awarded over the
mothers' objections, child support compliance was high); Fabricius et aI., supra note
319 (drawing on data from the Stanford Child Custody Study (data set now available
at http://www.socio.comlsrch/surnmary/afda/fam25-27.htm) and finding that in the
majority (79.5%) of joint residential custody families, one or both parents did not
initially want and agree to the arrangement); Marjorie Lindner Gunnoe & Sanford L.
Braver, The Effects of Joint Legal Custody on Mothers, Fathers, and Children
Controlling for Factors that Predispose a Sale Material Versus Joint Legal Award, 25
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 25, 25 (2001); Eleanor E. Maccoby et aI., Postdivorce Roles of
Mother and Fathers in the Lives of Their Children, 7 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 24, 34-35
(1993) (explaining that children in joint residential arrangements compared with other
children were most satisfied with the custody plan and showed the best long-tenn
adjustments, even after controlling for factors that might predispose parents to select
joint physical custody (such as education, income, and initial levels of parental
hostility».
356. See, e.g., William V. Fabricius & Jeff A. Hall, Young Adults' Perspectives on
Divorce: Living Arrangements, 38 FAM. & CONCILIATION CTS. REv. 446,454 (2000)
(reporting that 70% to 80% of university students, regardless of whether they were
male or female or from divorced or intact families, selected equal amounts of time
with both parents as the best living arrangement for children after divorce). A 2009
Nanos Research poll commissioned by a member of the Canadian Parliament found
78% of those surveyed nationally (86% in Quebec) support legislation to create a
presumption of equal parenting in child custody cases. Dads on the Air, Comment to
DOTA: Shared Parenting Why it Works, FAM. L. WEB GUIDE (Jui. 06, 2009),
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public opmIOn poll of other presumptions, including the
approximation rule, would receive similar endorsement. A survey
that allows participants to select which presumption they prefer
among several options may yield more convincing data on public
opinions regarding standards for adjudicating parenting time. In a
study that comes close to this design, Arizona citizens were asked
how they would allocate parenting time in response to hypothetical
custody cases in which either the mother or father provided 75% of
the childcare during the marriage. 357 The most preferred postdivorce
living arrangement selected by the participants was equal time with
both parents. 358 The next most preferred arrangement was to award
more time to the parent who provided more predivorce childcare, but
the division of time did not come close to the 75/25 allocation of time
mandated by the approximation rule. 359 Thus, more citizens favored
awarding equal parenting time than awarding more time to the parent
who provided 75% of pre divorce child-care; even those who favored
an unequal distribution of parenting time did not favor replicating the
predivorce division of caretaking time-they favored a more evenly
balanced division of parenting time. 360

357.
358.
359.
360.

http://www.familylawwebguide.com.aulforumlpgltopicview/misc/41 71 lindex.php&ke
ep_session=2049584127. In 2004, 85% of Massachusetts voters cast a "yes" ballot
for the following nonbinding proposition:
Presumption in child custody cases in favor of joint physical and
legal custody, so that the court will order that the children have
equal access to both parents as much as possible, except where
there is clear and convincing evidence that one parent is unfit, or
that joint custody is not possible due to the fault of one of the
parents.
Braver et aI., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at
217-18 (citing 2004 Massachusetts General Election Results, BOSTON.COM (2004),
http://www.boston.comlnews/special/politics/2004_results/general_electionlquestions
_alI_by_town.htm). The same proposition received 90% agreement when presented
in a public opinion poll of a representative sample of Arizona adult citizens. Id. At
218. Variables such as gender, age, income, political persuasion, marital status, or
child support status (ever paid or received support) had no impact on the results. Id.
Braver et aI., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at
222.
Id. at 223-25.
Id.
Id. A second study with the same sample provides further evidence that the public
prefers equal parenting time over the approximation rule. Id. at 230 (asking citizens
to respond to a hypothetical custody case in which the division of predivorce childcare was described as "about like average families in which both parents work fulltime (both M-F, 9-to-5)"). About 66% said that if they were the judge they would
award equal amount of times to each parent. Id. at 231. Respondents who preferred
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Naturally, prevailing public opinion is not an infallible guide to
the best custody standards; but the stability and enforcement of
family law and public policy reforms is related to cultural norms. 361
Also, recall that the Approximation Rule Survey shows that
experienced attorneys and child custody evaluators have little
confidence that the approximation rule would deliver the benefits
anticipated by ALI; instead, they believe that presumptions of sixtyfour/thirty-six time allocation or of equal time are somewhat more
likely to improve pre-trial settlement rates and reduce manipulative
bargaining. 362
Public policies that encourage children's involvement with both
parents after divorce are consistent with the scientific literature and
with prevailing public sentiment. 363 Legislation can define the best
interests of children to include parenting plans that maximize
parenting time when feasible and when no circumstances exist that
endanger the health, safety, or well-being of the children or a parent,
such as violence, abuse, gross neglect, severely compromised
parenting due to severe mental illness or severe substance abuse, or
extremely poor and harmful behavior toward the children?64 Such
policies clarify an aspect of children's best interests and establish an
important context for custody negotiations. 365
Evidence is
accumulating that closer to equal distributions of time are linked to
better outcomes for most children and parents. 366 An exact equaltime presumption, though, may bring similar liabilities as
presumptions that elevate a single factor (e.g., gender, past
caretaking, or children's preferences) above all others. 367 For
instance, if a parent uses additional time with the children to
undermine their love and respect for the other parent, this behavior
may offset the benefits of more time with the parent who manipulates
the children in this manner. 368 But more time with the parent who is

361.

362.
363.
364.
365.
366.
367.
368.

time distributions that memorialized the past would have endorsed the option of
awarding more parenting time to the mother. ld. at 235.
See Braver et aI., Lay Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at
215 (discussing three reasons why policy-makers pay attention to public values and
opinions).
Warshak, supra note 12.
Fabricius et aI., supra note 319, at 16.
See id. at 27-28.
Warshak, supra note 16, at 611-12.
ld.
ld.
See Richard A. Warshak, Bringing Sense to Parental Alienation: A Look at the
Disputes and the Evidence, 37 FAM. L.Q. 273,279 (2003).
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the target of bad-mouthing may help children resist efforts to tum
them against that parent. 369
2.

Quantity of Caretaking Time as an Index of Relative Strength
and Quality of Parent-Child Relationships

Notwithstanding the complications in measuring past caretaking
time and the likelihood of the exceptions swallowing the rule, and
even if the approximation rule could deliver on its promise to
streamline family court cases, it is a mistake to assume that quantity
of past caretaking is an objective index of the strength and quality of
the parent-child relationship or of the relative ability of each parent
to meet the child's needs after divorce. 37o Some threshold of
interaction is necessary to form and maintain a parent-child bond, but
evidence from a variety of studies argues against equating the
quantity of early caretaking with the quality of parent-child
relationships.371
Professor Lamb gives a scathing critique of the approximation
rule, faulting it for
institutionalizing a presumption that the relative
psychological and formative importance of each parent's
relationship with a child is directly proportional to the extent
of the parent's involvement in prior care of the child. The
available social science literature offers no empirical
support for this presumption ....
Other studies also show that, when questioned,
children of divorce commonly complain that they had
insufficient opportunities to interact with and be with their
nonresident parents. Implementation of the approximation
rule will not address the bases of this concern at all, because
it focuses only on the amounts of time, not on children's
psychological and emotional needs.

369.

See, e.g., id. at 294-97; Warshak., supra note 192, at 126-27; Braver et aI., Lay
Judgments About Child Custody After Divorce, supra note 34, at 232, (discussing a
survey in which a representative sample of the Arizona public would award more
parenting time to the parent who is the target of bad-mouthing).
370. Warshak, supra note 16, at 604-09.
371. See Michael E. Lamb,The Role of the Father: An Overview, in THE ROLE OF THE
FATHER IN CHILD DEVELOPMENT 4 (Michael E. Lamb ed., 1976) (citing multiple
studies to support the conclusion that, "[E]mpirical and theoretical considerations
indicate that the amount of time spent together is a poor predictor of the quality of the
infant's relationship with either mother or father").
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Research on topics as diverse as the effects of child
care, the determinants and formative importance of parentchild attachment, and the effects of postdivorce parenting
arrangements on children's adjustment shows the dangers of
confusing the quantity and quality of parenting or child care,
yet ·the approximation rule places its emphasis exclusively
and unashamedly on the quantity of time spent by parents
with their children. 372
Further evidence for the lack of relationship between caretaking
quantity and quality comes from studies that show comparable
adjustments of children in the custody of mothers and fathers who did
not have the maj ority of custodial responsibility in the marriage. 373
In addition, as recognized in several decisions, a child can spend
more time with, and have a stronger tie to, the parent who is less
equipped to meet his or her needs. 374 For instance, a boy may have a
strong tie and close identification with a father who treats the mother
violently. Children who are regularly and brutally beaten by their
parents usually have very strong and tenacious attachments to these
parents. 375 If offered a choice between a removal from their home or
remaining in the abusive environment, many children will choose to
remain with the abuser. 376 The strength of a child's attachment to a
372. Lamb, supra note 228, at 136. University of Cambridge Professor Lamb is generally
regarded as one of the world's leading scholars on parent-child relations. See also
NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, The Effects of Infant Child Care on
Infant-Mother Attachment Security: Results of the NICHD Study of Early Child Care,
68 CHILD. DEY. 860, 877 (\ 997) ("[C]hild care by itself constitutes neither a risk nor a
benefit for the development of the infant-mother attachment relationship . . . . ");
Nadya Pancsofar & Lynne Vernon-Feagans, Mother and Father Language Input to
Young Children: Contributions to Later Language Development, 271. ApPLIED DEV.
PSYCHOL. 571,582-83 (2006) (reporting that although mothers spoke more with their
young children than did fathers, fathers had a greater impact than mothers on language
development in two-year-olds).
373. Warshak, Father-Custody and Child Development, supra note 30; Richard A.
Warshak, How Children Fare in Father-Custody Homes, 15 FAM. ADvOC. 38 (1993).
374. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Bukacek, 907 P.2d 931, 936-37 (Mont. 1995); West v.
West, No. 2059-93-4, 1994 WL 583195, at *1-2 (Va. Ct. App. Oct. 25, 1994);
Loveland v. Loveland, No. 92-3144, 1994 WL \78559, at *5 (Wis. Ct. App. May 12,
1994).
375. See Douglas F. Goldsmith et aI., Separation and Reunification: Using Attachment
Theory and Research to Inform Decisions Affecting the Placements of Children in
Foster Care, 55 JUY. &FAM. CT. J. I, 1,6 (2004).
376. Id. at 1 ("[C]hi1dren find themselves tom between forming an attachment to their
foster parents while simultaneously longing to return to their parents. It may be
surprising to some that this longing develops even when there has been a documented
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parent, by itself, is a poor index of the quality of the relationships, the
competence of that parent, or the ability of that parent to meet the
child's current and future needs. 377
Similarly, there is no evidence that parents who spend more time
interacting with their children do so more competently.378 A socalled "helicopter" parent's excessive involvement in caretaking, for
example, can inhibit the child from developing an age-appropriate
sense of autonomy,379 and parents can be highly effective issuing firm
appropriate limits with minimal conversation, just as parents can be
ineffective engaging in lengthy explanations. 38o A parent who spends
thirty minutes nagging, cajoling, threatening, and yelling to get a
child to do his homework is not doing a better job than the parent
who relies on the strength of her authority and a five-second reminder
to secure the child's compliance.
Contrary to the quantitative standard of the approximation rule,
developmental psychologists strongly agree that the impact of the
parent-child relationship is better predicted by models that include
factors in addition to the amount of parent-child interaction, such as
the parent's sensitivity and responsiveness to the child's needs and
the emotional quality of the relationship.38I When adolescents

377.
378.

history of maltreatment."); see also Stephanie D. Block et ai., Abused and Neglected
Children in Court: Knowledge and Attitudes, 34 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 659, 659
(2010) ("[M]ost children wanted to return home.").
See Goldsmith et ai., supra note 375, at 1,4,6.
See PETER N. STEARNS, ANXIOUS PARENTS: A HISTORY OF MODERN CHILDREARING IN
AMERICA 99-103, 212-13 (2003).

379. Id. at4~7.
380. See, e.g., E. Mavis Hetherington, Martha Cox, & Roger Cox, Family Interactions and
the Social, Emotional, and Cognitive Development o/Children FollOWing Divorce, in
THE FAMILY: SETTING PRIORITIES 71, 72 01. c. Vaughan & T. Berry Brazleton eds.,
1979); KYLE PRUETT, FATHERNEED: WHY FATHER CARE Is AS ESSENTIAL AS MOTHER
CARE FOR YOUR CHILD 33-34 (2000) ("Over and over again in the science of father

381.

care, researchers point out that it is the quality of interaction between father and
child-that is, whether the father is sensitive to the child's needs and reactions-that
determines the overall value of his involvement in his child's life, not the quantity.
Counting the minutes that child and father are in each other's company tells us very
little about the ultimate influence of the father on the development of his child. What
fathers do with their children, how they do it, and, probably most important, how they
are with their kids matter more than how often or long they do it."); Richard A.
Warshak & John W. Santrock, Children of Divorce: Impact of Custody Disposition on
Social Development, in LIFESPAN DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: NON-NORMATIVE
LIFE EVENTS 241, 255 (Edward J. Callahan & Kathleen A. McCluskey eds., 1983).
Empirical support for this model is reported in Fabricius et ai., supra note 34, at 224.
In this model, parenting time exerts a causal relationship on child outcomes by setting
a ceiling on the potential amount of parent-child interaction. Amount of time spent
doing things together, in addition to the parent's responsiveness and low exposure to
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describe the essence of their relationships with their parents, they
focus on the same factors: the amount of time spent doing things
together, the ability to rely on the parent to meet the child's needs
(e.g., "She's always there for me."), and the emotional valence of the
relationship.382
Kelly faults the approximation rule for failing to "consider the
quality and meaning of children's relationship [sic] with each parent,
the age and developmental needs of children, or the substantial
changes in parental role and function necessarily precipitated by the
separation of the parents.,,383 In her appraisal of the primary caretaker
presumption Kelly describes concerns that are equally applicable to
the approximation rule:
[I]t ignores the quality of the relationship between the child
and the primary caretaker in favor of counting hours and
rewarding many repetitive, concrete behaviors. Indeed, the
most important emotional and interactive behaviors
promoting children's development and psychological,
social, and academic adjustment, such as love, acceptance,
respect; encouragement of autonomy, learning, and selfesteem, [and] moral guidance ... are not considered. 384
The Principles anticipates arguments about the importance of
quality over quantity and offers the defense that it is better to rely on
quantitative measurements because these are easier to make and thus
avoid qualitative disputes. 385 Legal reforms do involve trade-offs
between multi-factored, nuanced, and individualized decision making
versus ease of administration. 386 But as the earlier analysis showed, it
is not clear that the approximation rule would be easier to administer
than the best-interest standard. 387 Even if it is easier, defending a
measure merely because it is convenient brings to mind the story of

382.
383.
384.
385.

386.
387.

inter-parental conflict, contributes to the emotional security of the relationship. See
Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 356; Michael E. Lamb, Placing Children's interests
First: Developmentally Appropriate Parenting Plans, 10 VA. J. SOC. POL'y & L. 98,
106-07 (2002).
Fabricius et aI., supra note 34, at 223.
Kelly, supra note 318, at 241.
Kelly, supra note 46, at 130.
PRINCIPLES, supra note 3, § 2.08, cmt. c ("Any different measure, even if it is
otherwise reasonable, would only reintroduce the kinds of qualitative disputes that the
caretaking-functions factor is intended to reduce.") (emphasis added).
Warshak, supra note 16, at 609.
See supra Part IX.B.1.
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the man searching for his lost keys in the wrong place because the
light is better. The man will not find his keys and courts will not
define children's best interests by relying on what is easier to
measure merely because it is easier to measure. When legislators
weigh the potential of the approximation rule to streamline family
court cases, they should not assume that time invested in past
caretaking is an objective index of the strength of a child's
attachment to a parent, the quality of the relationship, the competence
of the parent, the ability of the parent to meet the child's needs, or the
motivation of the parent to do SO.388
X. REVISITING THE BEST-INTEREST STANDARD
We began with the question of whether the benefits of broad
discretion in contemporary custody adjudication outweigh the
drawbacks, and whether a more determinate rule can adequately
address legitimate concerns about the best-interest standard while
avoiding hazards such as an unacceptable degree of harm to
children's welfare. 389 This question has no simple answer. Professor
Schneider is probably correct that, with respect to custody disputes,
"[ A] motley mix of discretion, guidelines, and rules may be the best
we can do ... , [B]oth a purely discretionary and a purely rule-based
system would have intolerable drawbacks.,,390 Such a mix of
discretion and parameters for its exercise is precisely what has
evolved in contemporary applications of the best-interest standard. 391
Statutory and case law guidelines include elucidation of criteria to
be considered in defining best interests,392 which helps provide a
uniform framework for the court's application of the standard
through a nuanced investigation of a wide range of factors relevant to
children's welfare. 393
Other parameters include public policy
statements promoting frequent and continuing access to both
parents,394 specific parenting plans,395 mandates for mediation in cases
with no domestic violence, and specification of factors, such as
Warshak, supra note 16, at 608.
See supra Part V.
390. Schneider, supra note 46, at 2219.
391. See, e.g., John 1. Sampson, Bringing the Courts to Heel: Substituting Legislative
Policy for Judicial Discretion, 33 FAM. L.Q. 565 (1999) (discussing Texas legislative
restrictions on judicial discretion in custody trials).
392. Kelly & Emery, supra note 70, at 356.
393. Warshak, supra note 16, at 612.
394. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) (Deering 2010); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §
153.001(a)(1) (West 2010).
395. See, e.g., TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 153.311-17 (West 2011).
388.

389.

2011]

Parenting by the Clock

161

family violence and children's exposure to parental conflict, that limit
the range of permissible outcomes. 396
In addition to statutory and case law parameters, the best-interest
standard operates in a contemporary context of programs and
supports that provide attractive alternatives to litigation. 397 This
context includes a menu of model parenting time plans that educate
parents about the range of options and the benefits and drawbacks of
each;398 parent education programs about the impact of divorce on
children;399 encouragement of non-adversarial dispute resolution,
such as therapeutic mediation400 and collaborative law approaches;401
involvement of mental health professionals as consultants, evaluators,
and counselors; and post-mediation settlement conferences. 402 It is
reasonable to speculate that the contemporary context of the
application of the best-interest standard contributes to the very low
rate of custody trials. Support for this speculation is found in studies
that demonstrate significantly lower trial rates as a result of
mediation. 403

396. See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.004 (West 2011).
397. Warshak, supra note 16, at 603.
398. See, e.g., PLANNING FOR PARENTING TIME: ARIZONA'S GUIDE FOR PARENTS LIVING
APART, ARIZ. SUPREME COURT (2001), available at http://www.supreme.state.az.us
Idr/pd£'parenttime/parenttimela.pdf; OR. JUDICIAL DEP'T, BASIC PARENTING PLAN
GUIDE FOR PARENTS (2008), available at http://courts.oregon.gov/OJD/docs/OSCA
Icpsd/courtimprovementlfarnilylaw/CO VER. Ver08FINAL2008. pdf.
399. Jill R. Bowers et aI., A Review o/Online Divorce Education Programs, 49 FAM. CT.
REv. 776 (2011); Tamara A. Fackrell et aI., How Effective Are Court-Affiliated
Divorcing Parents Education Programs? A Meta-analytic Study, 49 FAM. CT. REv.
107 (2011); Amanda Sigal et aI., Do Parent Education Programs Promote Healthy
Postdivorce Parenting? Critical Distinctions and a Review o/the Evidence, 49 FAM.
CT. REv. 120 (2011).
400. See, e.g., Marsha K. Pruett & Janet R. Johnston, Therapeutic Mediation with HighConflict Parents: Effective Models and Strategies, in DIVORCE AND FAMILY
MEDIATION: MODELS, TECHNIQUES, AND ApPLICATIONS 92, 95 (J. Folberg, A. Milne &
P. Salem, eds. 2005).
401. TESLER, supra note 275, at 86.
402. Reforms aimed at helping couples avoid litigation are endorsed by the PRINCIPLES.
See, O'Connell, supra note 45, at 129 (clarifying that most of these programs would
be unaffected by adoption of the approximation rule, which is intended to operate
solely as a default provision for parents who are unable to reach an agreed-upon
division of parenting time).
403. Robert E. Emery, Lisa Laumann-Billings, Mary C. Waldron, David A. Sbarra & Peter
Dillon, Child Custody Mediation and Litigation: Custody, Contact, and Coparenting
12 Years After Initial Dispute Resolution, 69 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL.
323,323 (2001).
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The parameters and programs that set the contemporary context
for the application of the best-interest standard, while bending to the
current of political pressures from advocacy groups, also reflect the
immense progress that social scientists have made in understanding
children's adjustment after divorce. 404 As psychologists Robert
Emery and Joan Kelly summarize, "A continuing stream of
sophisticated social science and developmental research has
contributed a more complex understanding of factors associated with
children's positive outcomes and psychological problems in the
context of both marriage and divorce.,,405
The contemporary mix of judicial discretion, parameters, and
programs to assist parents in reaching informed and mutually
agreeable custody decisions should renew confidence in the viability
of a standard that carries the moral superiority of treating each child
as an individual.
XI. CONCLUSIONS
The approximation rule represents a return to a 19th-century
mechanistic view of the universe. It assumes that a complex
system-a family-can be understood by breaking it down into
discrete measurable units without regard for the transactions and
balance among the units. 406 It reduces the intricate rhythms of a
family's life together to only those interactions that can be measured
with a stopwatch. In so doing, it no more captures the essence of the
family than the number of words and lines convey the meamng,
value, and essence of a poem.
Proponents of the approximation rule believe it is more
straightforward than the best-interest standard and is a reasonable
proxy for children's best interests. 407 I have shown that the rule is
more difficult to implement than its supporters acknowledge and fails
to provide an acceptable short-cut to determining best interests. 408
We have no data to suggest that a past caregiving presumption will
reduce the likelihood of litigation or of children's harmful exposure
to parental conflict. But we do have data that tie other variables to
child well-being. Why should we require judges to ignore variables
that are supported in the scientific literature in favor of one variable
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that has no support?409 In the few cases that go to trial, courts can
better discern children's needs if the court's vision extends beyond
the narrow confines of judging the merits of parents' competing
claims about their parenting histories. 410
The best-interest test is not easy or efficient. Facing such a
complex task, we naturally welcome anything that can make the job
easier. 411 But a default rule that is difficult to implement and is out of
touch with current knowledge of child development is no
improvement. The approximation rule strives to relieve courts of a
comprehensive and individualized inquiry into children's best
interests. 412 Instead of elevating anyone factor above all others and
treating children as a homogenous group, a contemporary application
of the best-interest standard allows a multi-factored inquiry into
individual children's needs that can be regularly updated as new
knowledge emerges. 413 By reducing the decision to a single factor,
the approximation rule cannot capture the depth and richness of each
parent's role in a child's life. 414
Rather than abandon a comprehensive inquiry to shape a parenting
plan, public policy should continue to encourage private, amicable,
settlements while giving those few custody cases that reach the
courtroom all the attention that children deserve.
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